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I. INTRODUCTION
The initiative Proposition 187 has been a catalyst for change. Supporters
heralded it as the solution to "Save Our State"' from the ills of illegal immi-
gration. Those who opposed it, used Proposition 187 as a battle cry to mobil-
ize a disenfranchised minority.2 Irrespective of ideology, Proposition 187 en-
ded as no one could have predicted in November 1994 when it passed, 59%
to 41%. 3 When Governor Gray Davis inherited the Proposition 187 appeal
from former Governor Pete Wilson, Governor Davis took the unprecedented
step of seeking to resolve the conflict through mediation rather than actively
defending Proposition 187 on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
4
The Governor's decision is unique because no initiative has been settled by
mediation.5 Many criticize Governor Davis' decision arguing that it smacks of
a political ploy.6 Governor Davis stated that he would uphold his duty to de-
1. Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate Election:
Backers Seek Revolution in National Policy. Foes Predict Ill Educated, Disease Prone Under-
class, L.A. Tuias, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al. An Orange County-based organization adopted the slo-
gan Save Our State (S.O.S.) in support of Proposition 187. Id. The organization headed by Ron
Prince, a Tustin, California accountant, estimated that illegal aliens cost California $1.5 billion
each year for social services. Id. Supporters argued that California has suffered too long from il-
legal immigration specifically crime, costs of health care, education, and welfare. CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 91 (Nov. 8, 1994).
2. Proposition 187 became a touchstone for Latinos in California. They mobilized in oppo-
sition to Proposition 187 and gained political strength. Terry McDermott, Some Are Embittered
by Fate of Prop. 187, LA. TimEs, Aug. 2, 1999, at Al. The Proposition inspired widespread pro-
tests in opposition to the proposed legislation. Marc Lacey & Henry Chu, LAPD Calls Alert for
Student Rallies, LA. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1994, at BI. Latino activism continues. In the 1998 elec-
tion, Latino voters were 13% of the electorate. George Skelton, West King of the Center Says
Lungren Ran Too Far to the Right, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1998, at A3. In 1982, Latinos were only
6% of the electorate. Id
3. Proposition 187 was approved by the voters on November 8, 1994. Keith Bradsher et.
al., The 1994 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at BI I.
4. Governor Gray Davis did not support Proposition 187 in 1994 and has declared that if
Proposition 187 was a piece of legislation, he would veto it. Terri Hardy, Davis Seeks Mediation
on Prop. 187, LA. DAILY NEws, Apr. 16, 1999, at N1. Governor Davis had to defend Proposition
187 on appeal since the lawsuit challenging Proposition 187 was filed against then Governor Pete
Wilson. Ed Mendel, Davis Takes Middle Road on Prop. 187 Suit, SAN DIEOO UNION & TRIO.,
Apr. 16, 1999, at All. Former Governor Pete Wilson called Governor Davis' decision to mediate
a "breach of his constitutional duty." Dave Lesher & Dan Morain, Davis Asks Court to Mediate
on Prop. 187, L.A. TmEs, Apr. 16, 1999, at Al (quoting former Gov. Pete Wilson). The former
Governor urged Governor Davis to appeal to the United States Supreme Court, if necessary. Id.
5. When the mediation settlement was announced in August 1999, after months of talks,
Proposition 187 became the first California initiative to be settled by mediation. Patrick J. Mc-
Donnell, Prop. 187 Talks Offered Davis Few Choices, L.A. TIMEs, July 30, 1999, at A3.
6. Many believe that the Governor's decision is a way to seemingly support the appeal of
Proposition 187, but kill it softly through a mediated settlement. Phil Busse, Killing It Softly,
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fend the will of the people even though he was against Proposition 187
before he became Governor. The Governor's statement that he would defend
the will of the people seemed contradictory to his announcement that he
would not defend one of the most controversial sections of Proposition 187:
denying illegal children access to public education.7 The people of California,
however, will never know if he zealously defended Proposition 187.
One of the primary tenets of mediation is confidentiality. Its purpose is
to make participants more willing to openly communicate because the process
will be held in confidence among the participants. The Governor's decision to
mediate is paramount because it could cause an effect never foreseen in the
resolution of initiatives due to this unique nature of mediation:
confidentiality.8
CA. LAw., Aug. 1999, at 17. The Governor's decision to mediate Proposition 187 came just a
month before former President Ernest Zedillo's historic three-day visit to California. Rick Orlov.
Binding Relationship; Zedillo Hails New Era in L.A. Visit, LA D ILY NE-%S. May 20. 1999. at
NI. During President Zedillo's visit the Governor announced that he would never be a "party to
an effort to kick kids out of school." Dave Lesher, Davis Il'on't Follow Prop. 187 on Schools.
LA. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at Al. Many Latino supporters were enraged by the Governor's deci-
sion and termed it a betrayal, especially Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante. who called Pro-
position 187 neither "morally or legally defensible." Terri Hardy, Davis Seeks Mediation on
Prop. 187, LA. DALY NEws, Apr. 16. 1999, at NI. The Governor was in a political quagmire:
dropping the appeal appeases Latino voters, but appealing conflicts with his statements to support
the will of the people. Ed Mendel, supra note 4, at Al.
7. Some believe that the Governor is showing disrespect for the voters because he decided
not to defend the portions of Proposition 187 that he did not politically support. Davis Won't
Stick to Prop. 187 Clause, PREsss-ENrERPRisE (Riverside. Cal.). May 22. 1999, available in 1999
WL 18891195; see also Dan Morain, Debate Rises on Mediation of Proposition 187. LA. TvstES.
Apr. 20, 1999, at Al. One of the groups supporting Proposition 187, Pacific Legal Foundation
(PLF) wanted to challenge the 1984 Supreme Court decision Piyler %, Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1975).
granting illegal alien children the right to public school education. M. David Stirling. The Gover-
nor Disrespect State's Voters, S. F. CHROV., May 24, 1999, at 23. The Howard Jarvis Taxpayer's
Association filed suit with the California Supreme Court on June 1, 1999, to oppose mediation in
the settlement of Proposition 187, but the court unanimously denied the Association's request.
A.P., High Court Refuses to Block Prop. 187 Mediation Effort, LA. Tz.fs. July 2. 1999. at A26.
The Association claimed that it was neutral on the Proposition 187 issue, but opposed mediation
as a tool to resolve initiative conflicts. Id.
8. Many of those who support or oppose Proposition 187 are concerned that the mediation
of Proposition 187 will establish a precedent for settling disputes over initiatives. Dan Morain,
Debate Rises on Mediation of Proposition 187, LA. Tb, Es, Apr. 20, 1999, at Al. Terry Francke.
an attorney for the nonprofit First Amendment Coalition is concerned because of the lack of pub-
lic access in the resolution of Proposition 187. d Co-author of Proposition 187, Ron Prince is
concerned that precedent has been established for settling initiative battles that dilutes the will of
3
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The courts usually resolve conflicts arising from initiatives. 9 Many argue
that mediation of initiatives will set a poor example because there will not be
an appellate decision to establish legal precedent for important constitutional
issues.'0
This Article will examine the possible impact mediation will have on the
resolution of conflicts arising from initiatives. Part II discusses the initiative
process and briefly discusses Proposition 187 and its appeal." Until recently,
initiatives have been the cornerstone of grassroots organizations.' 2 Moneyed,
anti-minority groups frequently sponsor present day initiatives. 3 Part III ex-
plains mediation and its creative and beneficial attributes, 4 and the impact
the people. McDonnell, supra, note 1, at A3. Joel Fox, President Emeritus of the Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers' Association, likens the mediation of Proposition 187 to horse-trading. Joel Fox, Com-
mentary: Who Represents Voters at the Mediation Table?, L.A. TIMEs, June 1, 1999, at B5.
9. Governor Davis argued that he could not drop the appeal of Proposition 187 as his advi-
sors and supporters claimed because California law prohibits him from refusing to enforce a stat-
ute unless an appellate court has ruled the statute is unconstitutional. However, the constitutional
amendment the Governor refers to does not prohibit him from refusing to enforce a statute be-
cause the statute concerns administrative agencies and not a governor's duties. CAL CONST. art.
Il, § 3.5. Many constitutional scholars say the law is not clear and is "laden with technicalities,
but no clear obligation." Dave Lesher, Davis Faces Deep Dilemma over Appeal of Prop. 187.
L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al. The amendment reads:
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the Consti-
tution or an initiative statute, has no power:
(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis
of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that
such statute is unconstitutional; (b) To declare a statue unconstitutional; (c) To de-
clare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute . . . unless an appel-
late court has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is prohib-
ited by federal law or federal regulations.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
However, this constitutional amendment has been enforced against school officials, the state
controller, and other school employers. See Valdes v. Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983); see also,
Leek v. Washington Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1981).
10. Former Governor Wilson urged the Governor to appeal Proposition 187 to the United
States Supreme Court. See Lesher, supra, note 9. David Stirling, the Vice President of the Pacific
Legal Foundation called Governor Davis' decision to mediate 'Machiavellian'. David Stirling,
Davis' Prop. 187 Con Job, ORANGE CouNTY REG., May 19, 1999, at B8. Stirling urged the Gov-
ernor to appeal to the United States Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Plyler given the
harsh financial burden California bears by educating more than 300,000 illegal aliens. Id. Others
argue that since lower courts have largely eviscerated the law, the only way to resolve the legal-
ity is to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Behind the Gray Door, L.A. DAILY NEws,
July 7, 1999, at N12.
11. See infra notes 20-140 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 141-264 and accompanying text.
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mediation will have on the initiative process.' 5 Since the beginning of the Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") movement, mediation has been a
unique, party-empowering alternative to litigation. 16 Appellate mediation
draws upon private mediation and trial court successes; 7 however, a danger-
ous standard has begun with the mediation of Proposition 187 because of the
numerous constitutional issues involved.'8 Our society and courts need prece-
dent to maintain stability of stare decisis and society's trust in the govern-
ment, especially the judiciary.' 9
IL INIATIVES - CALIFORNIA'S ELECTORATE LEGISLATE
Since its inception in 1911," initiatives and referendums have been con-
troversial. 21 Primarily tools of the western states,2 initiatives and referendums
have had a stormy past.-3 At the turn of the twentieth century, Populists and
15. See infra notes 314-355 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 168, 192-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 148, 212-64 and accompanying text
18. See infra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 314-55 and accompanying text.
20. California's initiative and referendum constitutional amendments were passed on Octo-
ber 10, 1911. CAL. Co ST. art. IL §§ 8. 9.
21. James E. Castello, Comment. The Limits of Popular Sovereignt: Using the Initiative
Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAt. L Rsv. 491. 502-03 (1986). Numerous referen-
dums that passed so soon after direct democracy was adopted led to a California Constitutional
crisis because of the lack of orderly, cohesive adoption of amendments. See Karl Manheim &
Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LoY. LA. L
REV. 1165, 1188 (1998). Conservatives responded to the Progressives' championing of direct de-
mocracy by decrying that the process violated the Constitution's guarantee of a "republican form
of government." Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: 77e Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism 28
RuTGeRs LU. 787, 791 (1997).
22. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia allow for some sort of direct democ-
racy. Of these twenty-three, eleven are western states and eight are mid-western states. KK.
DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate Initiatives to Improve Citizen
Lawmaking, 63 U. CN. L REv. 1185. 1186-87 (1995).
23. The process of direct democracy has been the subject of numerous lawsuits and law
reviews. Almost every initiative is subject to some sort of challenge before or after passage. See
generally Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American Mest, 2 MicL L & POL'Y Rav. 11 (1997).
The conflict over direct democracy versus representative democracy has been raging since the
formation of the United States with the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates. David B.
Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U.
CoLo. L Rev. 13, 19-20 (1995). However, in 1912 the United States Supreme Court held that di-
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Progressives in California heralded direct democracy as a salve to the wounds
inflicted by the Southern Pacific Railroad controlled government.2 4 Initiatives
and referendums were to be the means to oust corporate control of state
government.2
Initiatives, which give a voice to citizens tired of not being heard in
government, flourished in California and other states2 6 at the end of the nine-
teenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.27 A Populist organi-
zation from Los Angeles garnered citizen support and learned from the suc-
cess of other states' direct democracy elections. 28 As a result of the statewide
increased Populist following, they were able to elect Hiram Johnson as Gov-
ernor29 who pushed through the constitutional amendments enacting Califor-
nia's direct democracy.30 Through the initiative process, Southern Pacific Rail-
road's influence on California's government decreased. 31
rect democracy does not violate the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. Pacific States TeL &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
24. The Southern Pacific Railroad controlled so much of California and its politics that
one author has likened California at the turn of the century as a third-world "Banana Republic."
See Manheim, supra note 21, at 1185. Republicans gathered across California in opposition to
the Southern Pacific Railroad control of the legislature. Id. at 1185-87.
25. Id. at 1185-87.
26. Twelve other states enacted some sort of direct democracy before California. Persily,
supra note 23, at 15. Those states were South Dakota, Utah, Oregon, Nevada, Montana,
Oklahoma, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Arkansas, Arizona, and Colorado. Id.
27. The Progressive politics advocated decision making by the people to oust railroads,
banks, lumber, and mining companies from controlling the legislature. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,
Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Demo.
cratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 399, 411-12 (1999).
28. The Los Angeles group was led by middle class Republican lawyers, reporters, profes-
sionals, and merchants influenced by Roosevelt and Taft who called themselves the Morning
Republicans. GEORGE E. MOWRY. THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESsIvES 21-22 (1961). The Morning
Republicans were successful in enacting direct democracy through an initiative in Los Angeles
four years before the state as a whole. Id. at 39.
29. The Morning Republicans from Los Angeles banded with other like-minded Republi-
cans to form the League of Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican Clubs whose diligent efforts finally
elected their own Republican candidate for governor, Hiram Johnson. Id. at 69-70.
30. To fulfill a campaign promise, Governor Johnson called a special election to enact Cal-
ifornia's direct democracy devices - the initiative and the referendum. MOWRY, supra note 28, at
135-40. California voters approved the Constitutional amendment on October 10, 1911. Id.; see
also C.A. CONST. art. 11, §§ 8, 9. The amendments were approved by a vote of 168,744 to
52,093. Reports of the California Constitutional Revision Commission, the Initiative Process (vis-
ited February 27, 2001) <http://library.ca.gov./california/CCRC/reports/html/
hs_initiativeprocess.html>.
31. Persily, supra note 23, at 31. In the 1911 special election, voters approved twenty-two
of the twenty-three amendments, which included women's suffrage. Id. After winning the election
in 1911, Governor Johnson toured the state by car instead of train, announcing that the Southern
Pacific should keep its dirty hands out of government. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FI-
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Since their inception, initiatives and referendums have proposed various
legislation and constitutional amendments with topics ranging from taxation.
the environment, and the reorganization of government?2 Use of the initiative
waned during the middle of the century, but gained momentum in the 1970s
and is currently a powerful tool in the political process.3
The initiative 4 process today is less a grass roots solution to big govern-
ment than the Populists had hoped. The process is fraught with influence
from the politically powerful and wealthy.35 The initiative process has become
more politicized by candidates who champion various propositions during
their campaign.36 Currently, it costs over one million dollars to finance an ini-
tiative from its inception to its passage.37 The money is spent on media
blitzes, which are supposed to educate the voters, yet they often appeal to the
voters' raw emotions. 38 Some of the money pays for ballot-qualifying, mini-
NANCING. DEOCRACY BY IN1miATmV SHAPNG CALFORNIA's FOURTH BRANH or- GovvtE%,mTr 37
(1992).
32. From 1970 to 1986, 51 initiatives qualified for the ballot. Of those, fifteen were regu-
latory provisions, twelve dealt with taxation, nine advocated reform of the structure of govern-
ment, six dealt with the environment, and three related to public works. MmAt Fo.;G Eu. A His.
TORY OF THE CALIFORIA INrATIvE PRocEss 30 (1992).
33. The period from 1940 to 1970 was a particularly low period for initiatives - only 302
appeared on the ballot in all direct democracy states from 1950 to 1960. Persily, supra note 23,
at 38. During the same period in California, there was a resurgence of professionalism in the
Legislature that was considered a national model. WtVt1st K. MUIR. CAIFORNIA'S Scitoot. FOR
PoLmcs 13 (1982). In 1990 alone, eighteen initiatives were passed. See JotN M ALMSANG.
CALIoR-A Irnmvrirvs Aim RuEzEaNmts 1912-1990 12. By the end of the 1990's, it is pro-
jected that over 350 initiatives will have been placed on various state ballots. Magleby, supra
note 23, at 27.
34. This Article will use the term initiative to include both referendum and initiative.
35. The common use of initiatives is for the "well-heeled special interests" that wish to
make their wishes into state law. Initiatives: Use and Abuse, LA. Tt.mEs, Apr. 19, 1998, at M4.
36. Gubernatorial candidates regularly sponsor their own initiatives. Candidate John K. Van
de Kamp sponsored three initiatives in 1990. Co.ssusstoi O.4 CA.mtPAtm FNtcLN. supra note
31, at 63. Governor Pete Wilson's sponsorship of Proposition 187 is an example of candidates
using initiatives as part of their election platform. Infra note 38 and accompanying text.
37. The average cost of an initiative to qualify was one million dollars in 1990. John
Garamendi, Insurers Lost the Battle, but 1Uon the ir, LA. DAILY J., May 16. 1990. at 6. In
1990, five measures had over SlO million in contributions. CALWFoRN A Co.,4ssto. o. CAXt.
PAIGN FiNArtce, supra note 31, at 266. It may be more cost effective for a special interest group
to spend one million advocating on behalf of an initiative than SIO million or more for advertis-
ing designed to defeat a measure. I&
38. In one notorious media campaign in 1988. a group opposed to campaign finance re-
form targeted voters by suggesting in an advertisement that Nazi storm trooprs might receive
7
Lucy: Mediation of Proposition 187: Creative Solution to an Old Problem
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2001
mum signature collection, 39 which can cost as much as $1.20 a signature.40
However, even with this massive outlay of cash, most of the initiatives do not
survive after qualifying for the ballot because they either do not garner
enough votes4' or are struck down as unconstitutional before implementa-
tion.42 The tool that was to give a voice to the people has undergone a meta-
morphosis into a political machine that can be driven by one person who has
enough money and savvy to know how to manipulate the people via expen-
sive advertisement into voting for his initiative.43
Proposition 187 is a shining reflection of how the initiative process has
changed from a tool to cut the strings of a government controlled by a pup-
pet-master corporation, powerfully giving the people a voice, to a tool to op-
press and shun those who are culturally different from the white majority."4
public financing should the proposition pass. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
supra note 31, at 200. In contested proposition elections, voters rank television and other media
outlets above the state produced ballot pamphlet as the means of determining how to vote.
THOMAS E. CRONIN. DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLmCS OF INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND RECALL
82 (1989). The more complex the ballot initiative, the more likely the electorate will respond and
vote with their emotions rather than devoting time and effort into deciphering a measure. See
DuVivier, supra note 22, at 1195-96.
39. Qualification is not an easy process. First, the sponsors must collect the signatures of
voters equal to 5% for initiatives and 8% for referendum of "votes for all candidates for Gover-
nor at the last gubernatorial election." CAL CONST. art. 2 §§ 8, 9. Then, the sponsors must pres-
ent the text of the initiative or referendum with the certified signatures to the Secretary of State.
Id.
40. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 31, at 267. The United
States Supreme Court declared the limitation on paid signature collection unconstitutional in vio-
lation of the First Amendment. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
41. From 1912 to 1992, California voters approved 42 out of 121 statutory initiatives giv-
ing a passage rate of 34.7%. See Magleby, supra note 23, at 26 tbl. 1. During the same period,
California voters approved 36 of 115 constitutional referendums, giving a passage rate of 31.3%.
Id. Only three of the seventeen California statewide initiatives passed in 1990. A.G. Block &
Richard Zeiger, Constitutional Offices and Ballot Propositions-Election 1990, CAL. J., Dec. 1,
1990.
42. From 1960 to 1980 only two initiatives were not declared unconstitutional in whole or
part. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNrIED
STATES 203 (1984). Since 1974, the courts have completely invalidated only three of the twenty-
nine passed initiatives. See Chemical Specialities Mfrs. Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 278 Cal. Rptr. 128,
132-33 (Ct. App. 1991); Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990); Estate of Gibson, 189 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1983).
43. Sixty percent of the total spent on Proposition 227's qualification and campaign was
donated by Robert Unz, a software entrepreneur. Frank Bruni, The California Entrepreneur Who
Beat Bilingual Teaching, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at Al. Mr. Unz is contemplating fixing
other political problem areas including campaign finance. Todd S. Purdum, California Republican
Tries Altering Campaign Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A20. Mr. Unz proclaims that
he "fixed bilingual education ... but good." Id.
44. Proposition 187 appeals to the fears of the majority by perpetuating false stereotypes.
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Proposition 187 was a bastion of bias and prejudice born of fear and uncer-
tainty in an economic recession. 45 Former Governor Wilson in his reelection
campaign reinforced racial stereotypes to appeal to the fear of the white, con-
servative Californians felt by allegedly being "taken over" by illegal aliens.6
Just as many propositions before and after, Proposition 187 was chal-
lenged in court 4 7 which delayed it from taking effect.4s Proposition 187 is a
prime example of how the initiative process has changed over the twentieth
century. With the continual rise of the use of the initiative process, those ini-
tiatives which oppress, malign, and degrade will become more common, as a
result of fear, not of some conscious decision to reform the political machine
as the Populists had hoped.49
A. A Hard Won Battle for California's Direct Democracy
The controversy over direct democracyO began well before California
even became a state. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists debated the best
Minty Siu Chung, Proposition 187: A Beginner's Tour Through A Recuring Nightmare. I UC
DAVIS J. INT'L L & POL'Y 267, 279-80 (1995). The founders of Proposition 187 seemed to be
motivated by nativism, prejudice, and racial resentment. See Vargas. supra note 27. at 464. Racial
anxiety and tension can be seen throughout the campaign rhetoric, advertising and media images.
Id at 468.
45. Proposition 187 was passed in 1994 when California was still in the throws of a harsh
recession. See Chung, supra note 44, at 267 (noting the recurrence of anti.immigrant sentiment
when in an economic recession or depression).
46. Governor Wilson was accused of flaming the fires of fear between %%hites and illegal
immigrants. See Vargas, supra note 27, at 453. Governor Wilson "showered the airwaves" with
television advertisements depicting Latino-looking individuals "overrunning and swarming"
around the United States-Mexican border. Id.
47. Public interest groups and individual citizens brought suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to bar the California Governor, Attorney General and other state agencies from enforc-
ing provisions of Proposition 187. See League of United Latin American Citizens P. 1i7son. 903
F. Supp. 755 (1995). These actions were consolidated and the district court struck down most of
the provisions as either being unconstitutional or preempted by federal law. Id.
48. Paul Feldman & James Rainey, Parts of Prop. 187 Blocked by Judge. LA Tturs, Nov.
17, 1994, at Al.
49. The rise in popularity of initiatives has seen the rise of anti-minority initiatives, espe-
cially against those most reviled - gays and illegal aliens. Vargas supra note 27. at 421-37.
50. Direct democracy includes initiatives. referendum, and recall. See generally Patrick L
Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions. 28
N.M. L. REV. 343 (1998).
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form of government before the second Constitutional Convention." Federal-
ists Alexander Hamilton and James Madison advocated the republican form
of government over direct democracy because of concerns about mob rule.-"
Madison warned in Federalist 47 that "[t]he accumulation of all powers leg-
islative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands ...may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny."' 3 The Anti-Federalists, led by
Thomas Jefferson, proposed a government with more citizen participation."'
Direct democracy traces its roots to the writings of Jean J. Rousseau"
and Thomas Paine.' 6 While the Founding Fathers were well aware of these
writings, they nevertheless enacted a republican form of government while
expressly rejecting direct democracy' 7 The Federalists won a clear victory be-
cause in rewriting the Constitution, the people did not have a direct voice in
their government. The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, al-
lowing for direct election of Senators, gave the people of the United States
51. Concerned over the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the Framers chose to in-
crease the power of the federal branches of government by distributing its power among the three
branches to decentralize any overreaching power by the states or one branch. Marci A. Hamilton,
The First Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Contentpo-
rary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 GA. L. REv. 81, 85-90 (1994).
52. The people, just as the other branches of government, can act oppressively and over-
step their authority. Madison warned that the "majority, having such co-existent passion or inter-
est" must be prohibited from acting in concert to "carry into the effect schemes of oppression,"
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). By not following the writings of Rousseau, the Fram-
ers saved the United States from the horrors of the first French Republic, which was marred by
violence and frequent use of the guillotine. ELLIS P. OBERHOLTZER. THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA
66-67 (1971).
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
54. Thomas Jefferson noted that the citizens themselves are the "safest depository of their
own rights" and the evils of citizen rule are less than those from the "egoism of their agents."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816, in THE LtFE AND SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 668, 672-73 (Adrienne Kock & William Peden eds. 1944).
55. The basis of Rousseau's Social Contract was that the people act as government. Daniel
M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of Themselves; see also
The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A Local Government Perspective, 19 SEAxrrue
U L. Rv. 47, 49 (1995).
56. Thomas Paine influenced Benjamin Franklin, who himself became acquainted with
Rousseau from Paine's Common Sense. THOMAS PAINE. COMMON SENSE. AND OTHER POLmCAL
WRrnNoS (Nelson F. Adkins ed., Liberal Arts Press 1953)(1776). Franklin was so taken with
Paine, whom he met during the Revolutionary War, and his theories, that Franklin successfully
advocated strong reverence to the will of the people in the formation of Pennsylvania's constitu-
tion. Oberholtzer, supra note 52, at 57.
57. The message of the Constitution is clear. Individuals who vote for their own interests
are less desirable than a representative government where the representatives will vote for the
collective greater good. Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1997). See also Hamilton, supra note 51, at 87. See also Warner,
supra note 55, at 51.
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their first taste of direct democracy under the Constitution.5s However, direct
democracy faired better in the western United States.59 Many theories explain
this unusual development of direct democracy.60 Irrespective of theory, the
people of the west were accustomed to making decisions regarding govern-
ment.61 In most western states, citizens voted directly to decide the location
of the capital and to adopt state constitutions.62 Some commentators trace the
rise of direct democracy to the appeal of the individualistic, moralistic aspects
of direct democracy that also typifies the western citizen. 1
The Progressive movement in American history coincides with the rise
in direct democracy's popularity.64 The western states were bastions for the
Progressive movement, and consequently, direct democracy as well.6s In the
58. The western states had a tradition of direct democracy on a state wide level making
both citizens and politicians more familiar with the process, than their counterparts in the South
and East. Perilsy, supra note 23, at 19.
59. Ratification of most of the western state constitutions and selection of the state capitals
were by referendum. Id at 20. These referendums sometimes occurred even efore election of
candidates. Id James Madison's concern over mob rule seemed less important almost a centuy
later. Id. at 21.
60. One author explains that the western states were more susceptible to direct democracy
because they were newly established and the rise of Progressivism easily led to structural reform.
Charles M. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Iestern
Phenomenon, 28 NV. POL Q. 243, 248 (1975). See generally Patrick L Baude. A Comment on the
Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions. 28 N.M- L Rrv. 343 (1998).
61. See generally Perisly, supra note 23. at 19-20.
62. Id.
63. Daniel Elazar, a political scientist, theorizes that the citizens of the West were individ-
ualistic, traditionalistic, and moralistic, which influenced their view of government. DstEL J,
ELAzAR. Asmcmc FEDERAuSm: A View FRoMt THE STATES 5 (1972). Progressivism embraces
these views of government. Id. Accordingly, the western states were more susceptible to the Pro-
gressive movement and its final influence on the structure of government. Id. at 114-18.
64. Magleby, supra note 23, at 15.
65. Id. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado. Idaho. Montana, Nevada. Oregon. Utah.
Washington, and Wyoming are the western states which have some form of direct democracy.
ALAsKA STAT. §§ 15.45.010-45.245(1999); See ARtz. Co.SsT ART. IV, Pt. 1. § i: See ARit.
CoNsT. ART. XXIL §14; See Amtt Rav. STAT. A ,. §§ 19-101 to -144 (1999); See CAL. Co.;sr.
ART. II, §§ 8-10; See COLO. CoNs. art. V, § 1 See COLO REv. STAT. §§ 140-101 to -133
(1995); See IDAHO CODE §§ 34-1802, -1804 to -1806. -1809. -1813 (1999); See Mo.'r Co.;Sr.
art. III, § 4; See MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 13-27-101 (1996); See NEv CoxsT art. IXM . §§ 2(1; See
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 295.015, 255.035 (1999); See Op. Co.xsr, art. IV, § 1t21(a); See O. REv
STAT. § 254.030 (1999); See UTAH CODE ANN, §§ 20A-7-102 (1999); See WAsit Co!sT art It
§1(a-b); See WAsH. REv. CODE ArN. §§ 29.79.010 (1999); See WO Co.sr art. 1 §. art. ll. §
52; See Wyo. STAT. §§ 22-24-101 (1999).
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the middle class became increas-
ingly frustrated with corporate controlled government and the Progressive
movement reflected such frustration. 66 The Progressive movement was a result
of dramatic increases in industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. 67 Di-
rect democracy was a response to shifts in the economic and political arenas,
which was spurred by industrialization and urban growth.61 Citizens distrusted
a legislature controlled by powerful, narrow interest corporations that did not
reflect their interest or concerns. 69 As a result, the Progressive movement, ad-
vocating direct democracy to eradicate such domination, gained a ground
swell of support in the western states. 70 Progressives believed that direct de-
mocracy could not only oust big business from controlling the government,
but it would also increase interest and understanding of important political
issues.
7 l
Direct democracy was seen as a battering ram wielded by the citizen to
curb the excesses of corporate controlled government. 72 California used its
club to oust the Southern Pacific Railroad from controlling state and munici-
pal governments. 73 The Progressives' success in California and elsewhere typ-
66. Justice Tobriner called the direct democracy amendments to the California Constitution
"one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900's." Associ-
ated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 (1976).
67. In the 1850s, the western states experienced immense growth. Perisly, supra note 23 at
21.
68. Lloyd Spoonholtz, The Initiative and Referendum: Direct Democracy in Perspective
1898-1920, 14 AMER. STUDIES 43, 60 (1973).
69. Initiatives inherently reflect a distrust of the legislature and act as a check on the
power of the legislature. Manheim & Howard, supra note 21, at 1169.
70. Price, supra note 60, at 247. Advocates of Progressivism and direct democracy es-
poused "every normal citizen who is mentally and morally fit not only has the right, but is also
under a duty to participate in the solution of political problems." LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
CALIFORNIA. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 4 (quoting Benjamin
DeWitt). The Progressives were optimistic about the benefits of direct democracy and believed
that the "collective will would cause evil to perish and good to triumph." Cynthia L. Fountaine,
Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Ini-
tiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 736 (1988).
71. By giving citizens direct control of their government, proponents of direct democracy
predicted an increase in voter interest and comprehension of significant civic and political issues.
Nick Brestoff, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL L. REV.
922, 922 (1975); Herbert Graham, The Direct Initiative Process: Have Unconstitutional Methods
of Presenting the Issues Prejudiced its Future?, 27 UCLA L. REv. 433, 437 (1979).
72. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. et. al. v. State Bd. of Equalization et. aL.,
22 Cal.3d 208, 228 (1978). See generally Stephen H. Sutro, Comment, Interpretation of liuitia-
tives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Cannons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure
Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 945, 948 (1994) (describing the use of initiatives to ig-
nored interest groups).
73. The Southern Pacific Railroad blackmailed Los Angeles into giving it $600,000 and 60
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ifies the ability of multiple minority groups to bind together for a common
goal: ousting corporate control of the government. 74 The Progressives saw di-
rect democracy as a governmental ideal, not just the means to achieve their
goal.75
B. Modem Direct Democracy Ruled by Moneyed Organizations
Direct democracy was a popular tool of the citizens during the early
twentieth century,76 but lost its popularity in the middle decades" only to
have a resurgence at the end of the twentieth century.78 Modernly, small
groups use direct democracy to enact legislation favoring their limited inter-
ests. 79 These small organizations are largely financed by a select group of
acres of land by threatening to build railroad lines around rather than through Los Angeles.
GEORGE F. MowRy. THE CALIFORNIA PRooRtssvEs 9 (1951). The railroad controlled the Oakland
waterfront and ferry service. Id. at 10. The Southern Pacific would force other businesses to open
its books to the railroad and if the business was doing well, then the Southern Pacific would
charge more for transportation of that business' goods. Id. at 9. 11. Theodore Roosevelt praised
California's passage of direct democracy measures by proclaiming California had set in motion
"a new era in popular government" and had made "the greatest advances ever ... by a state for
the benefit of its people." WALTON BEAN, CALF0Itr' AN, L'%'rFREnvm Hts'roay 326 (19T3).
74. The growth of direct democracy is attributable to the creation of new interest groups
along multiple issues to advocate change in economic and social problems during a period of
great change. Perisly, supra note 23. at 21-22.
75. Feeling straightjacketed by the political system. Progressives sought reform via direct
democracy. Some saw the direct democracy process as a means to change cultural ills. Spoon-
holtz, supra note 68, at 60. While others portrayed direct democracy as "the final steps in the
perfection of democratic utopia." Perisly, supra note 23, at 28.
76. During the first few years of direct democracy, voters approved over 100 out of 150
initiatives. James M. Ftscher, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State
Constitutional Jurisprudence, I1 HAsa'lGs Co.sr LQ 43 (1983). See supra text and accompa-
nying notes 32-34.
77. The use of direct democracy dropped off significantly from the 19405 to the 19M.)s,
Magleby, supra note 23, at 27-28, fig. 1 & 2. There were no initiatives on the June 1992 ballot.
marking the first time since 1964 that an election did not have an initiative on the ballot. Paul
Feldman, Snapshots of Lfe in the Golden State: Voters No Longer Feel Like Propositioning, LA.
TimEs, Dec. 30, 1991, at A3.
78. From 1990 to 1996, the Auorney General for signature collection has approved 199 in-
itiatives. Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem, Judicial Re'iew of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing
Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy. LA. L Ray. 1239, 1254 tbl. 2 (1998). Of those 199.
only 44 qualified for placement on the ballot. Id. The voters passed only 15 of the 44 qualified
initiatives. Id. Nine of the 15 initiatives were challenged with only four being upheld. Id.
79. The initiative process rewards those groups that capitalize on minority manipulation.
DuVivier, supra note 22, at 1206. Such groups have realized that they have a tool to circumvent
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supporters.80 The current landscape of direct democracy requires that the
sponsors be financially well heeled and politically savvy.8' All too frequently,
these groups and their initiatives are racist8 2 and have similar racist begin-
nings.83 While many of these groups may not be successful in passing their
initiative or surviving court challenges,s ' they nevertheless have a prodigious
impact on the political landscape. 5
No longer are the goals of direct democracy to bring the power to the
people, but to bring power to the groups with the most money and media
the legislature so long as they are well financed and organized. Liberal and conservative groups
alike enact various initiatives to reflect their political ideology. Perisly, supra note 23, at 38.
While one group or monopoly has not controlled California since Southern Pacific Railroad, or-
ganizations reflecting concerns of minority of citizens have risen. Such groups include various
Political Action Committees, the National Rifle Association, and the American Association of
Retired Persons. Id. at 40. See generally Scheiber, supra note 21, at 813 (detailing the varied ide-
ological bases for many of California's initiatives).
80. In 1990, 67% of the donations were in amounts of $100,000 or more. CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING REFORM, supra note 31, at 279.
81. In the 1990 gubernatorial election, every major candidate, including Diane Feinstein,
John Van De Kamp, and Pete Wilson sponsored initiatives. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEOIsLA.
TION IN THE AMERICAN STATES, IN REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 234 (1994). The only thing
more powerful than money is public discontent which is directed and reflected in initiatives. JIM
SHULTz, THE INITIATIVE COOKEOOK: RECIPES & STORIES FROM CALIFORNIA'S BALLOT WARS 5
(1996) (quoting Harvey Rosenfield, author of Proposition 103).
82. Starting as early as 1920 with the passage of the Alien Land Law, which prohibited
aliens who were ineligible for citizenship to purchase real property, the initiative became a tool
to oppress the disenfranchised minority in California. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 70,
at 24. In the more recent past, however, initiatives have become the tool of majorities to promote
their interest while squashing minority interests. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democ-
racy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.REv. 1, 20-23 (1978). But cf. JOSEPH F. ZIMMER-
MAN. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVISITED 89-98 (1986)(arguing that it is a myth that
direct democracy targets minorities). CRONIN, supra note 38, at 98 (reporting that the overall re-
cord of direct democracy supports minority rights).
83. Anti-minority initiatives have similar histories that appeal to the fears of the white ma-
jority. In Miami, after the city had enacted an anti-discrimination ordinance for housing and em-
ployment, Anita Bryant spearheaded a campaign to "Save Our Children." ANITA BRYANT. TIlE
ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT
HOMOSEXUALITY 27-29 (1977). She stated that God tapped her on the shoulder and gave her
marching orders. Id. She also said that she might as well feed her children garbage if they were
exposed to homosexuality. Id. Also in Miami, two women came together to start an English-only
initiative after both called in to a radio talk show to complain that the non-English speaking were
taking over the state. Vargas, supra note 27, at 467.
84. Magleby, supra note 23, at 28. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an increase in peti-
tion circulation, but not a corresponding increase in initiative adoption. Id.
85. Scheiber, supra note 21, at 799; see also Fischer, supra note 76, at 44-45. Proposition
187 is credited with the changes in welfare with regards to the denial of social services to illegal
aliens. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that denial of welfare benefits to illegal aliens is preempted by federal law).
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coverage. Grass roots organizations cannot compete with more financially and
politically shrewd organizations.8 6 The organizations that the Progressives
sought to oust now either sponsor their own initiatives or contribute heavily
in favor of or against a particular initiative.Y
The greatest difference between historical and modem direct democracy
is the impact of money. Presently, sponsors must be well financed to afford
the costs of political advisors, lawyers, media advertising, public relations
costs, and other qualification costs.88 Because California has easy access to
the "ballot, money .... sophisticated media, and a higher than usual popula-
tion of self-made millionaires," it has produced some of the most controver-
sial initiative issues.89 An "initiative industry" has exploded to oversee signa-
ture collection with computerized mailings and media blitzes.90
At the beginning of direct democracy in California, initiative supporters
were the models of grass roots organizations that wished to oust big business
from the government while returning the power to the people.91 However,
86. Such grass roots organizations face an uphill battle in being heard by the voters.
Scheiber, supra note 21, at 816. Even if grassroots organizations were able to compete, the direct
democracy process is fraught with problems. For example, there has been great abuse in the sig-
nature-gathering phase during ballot qualification. CALIFoRNIA AssEI.DLY ELECT1O.S AND REAP.
PORTIO,,NET CoMMITTEE, Putlic HEARING ON TE I xAInVE PROCESS 2. 32 48 (Oct. 10. 1972).
Some of these problems include children being employed as signature gatherers. forgery, and the
gatherers' use of short catchy phrases to describe the initiative thus obscuring the Attomey Gen-
eral's official summary. Id. Money is needed to support polling, focus groups, and public opinion
research in addition to the other costs associated with bringing an initiative to the voters. Strtrtrz.
supra note 81, at 15-22.
87. Supra text and accompanying notes 35 and 36.
88. The media serves a key role in the success of initiatives. They can narrowly frama is-
sues around anti-minority sentiment intended to evoke emotional reactions regardless of the po-
tential impact on minorities. RICHARD K. Scmam THE MODERN PoLrricAL CA.pAGN MtUsuXo,-
INo. BoMBAsTr. AND mE VrrAt.rrY oF AMERICAN PoLtTIcs 100-15 (1998). The media's role is
particularly heinous because it routinely "artfully contrive[s] atmosphere of alarm. distortion of
facts, and a general atmosphere of opinion manipulation . Id.
89. Vargas, supra note 27, at 420.
90. Scheiber, supra note 21, at 815.
91. Grass roots organizations cannot compete with well-financed groups because a massive
amount of cash is needed at every stage of the initiative process. Cash is needed to pay for sig-
nature solicitors to collect signatures (approximately 700,000) in a short period of time (150
days). CA. ELEc. CODE §§ 9013, 9040 (West 1996). Using attorneys to ensure that the language
of the initiative is constitutional and unambiguous can increase the cost of getting an initiative
passed and upheld. Some commentators have foreseen the rise of initiatives being ruled by small
groups joined by some common interest, rather than some romantic notion of power to the peo-
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modem groups supporting direct democracy wish to oust the people's control
of the government, returning it to the control by a minority of citizens or big
business.92
Direct democracy has entered into a new era. It is overwhelmingly popu-
lar,93 state courts are deferential to initiatives, 94 and popular politicians such
as Ross Perot and Jack Kemp urge a national referendum. 95 While a popular
ple. V.O. KEY. JR. & WINSTON W. CROUCH. THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA
572 (1939).
92. The effect of such a high barrier to getting an initiative on the ballot results in well-
financed groups being the only successful groups to be heard and to have the initiative voted
upon. Scheiber, supra note 21, at 816. Often these groups are the very ones that direct democ-
racy was enacted to limit.
93. Vargas, supra note 27, at 420.
94. California state courts are more likely to uphold initiatives when challenged than their
federal counterparts. Holman, supra note 78, at 1254 tbl. 2. As a result, challengers are more
likely to file their lawsuit in federal court where their chances of getting the initiative thrown out
are greater. Id. at 1253. See generally id. at 1263 (calling for a panel of three judges to decide
challenges to initiatives which would theoretically be more deliberative and less the result of one
judge's bias).
The state courts have been so deferential that they have removed many of the checks insti-
tuted to protect against abuses in the direct democracy process. The single subject rule of Cali-
fornia's Constitution Article II, Section 8(d) has been so broadly interpreted that it is no longer a
protection against packaging numerous pieces of legislation into one mega-initiative. Brosnahan
v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 279 (1982). Moreover, the distinction between a referendum and an initi-
ative has practically been judicially eliminated. CAL CONST. art. II, § 9; see also Rossi v. Brown,
889 P.2d 557, 559 (1995). California state courts are very willing to enforce an initiative's sever-
ability clause even if it is counterproductive and confounds voter intent. Such problems with sev-
erability were highlighted in the court challenges of Propositions 68 and 73 in the 1988 election
whereby the California Supreme Court ended up cutting and pasting parts of initiatives together.
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Prac. Comm., 51 Cal.3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220,
274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990); Service Employees Int'l v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 955
F.2d 1312 (1992); see also Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 863 P.2d 694 (1993).
Moreover, the courts do not generally observe the constitutional limitation on initiative topics
limited to legislation, not administrative regulations. McKevitt v. Sacramento, 203 P. 132 (1921)
(proposing two-part test to determine the character of an initiative as either legislative or admin-
istrative); see also Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125; 222 P.2d 225 (1950); see also Committee of
Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988)(re-
jecting the two-part test for a more comprehensive statewide test).
California courts do not usually decide the constitutionality of a proposition before the elec-
tion and rarely remove such proposition from the ballot. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUs.
TICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 107-09 (1989). Moreover, California state
courts are more decisive and quick in their decision. In Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmnejian, 771 P.2d
1247, 1249-50 (1989), it took the Supreme Court of California two days to stay Proposition 103.
However, in Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446, 1453-55 (N.D. Cal. 1997), the federal district
court took six years to decide the merits of Proposition 140.
95. There have been many supporters of using direct democracy as a check on Congress.
Ross Perot's use of the "electronic Town Hall" in his 1992 presidential campaign would have
enabled voters across the country to debate and vote on legislation. Ross PEROT. UNITED WE
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tool of the voters and politicians, direct democracy is not without its critics.
Many argue that direct democracy violates the Guarantee Clause of the
United States Constitution. 6 Others advocate a stricter standard of scrutiny on
appeal because of the lack of voter understanding of the nature of the initia-
tive due to apathy, misleading media campaigns, and complexity of voter
pamphlets. 7 Still others understand the popularity of direct democracy, but
would like to see a more cohesive constitutional test when minority rights are
at issue 5
Coinciding with the advent of new moneyed direct democracy, the ma-
jority of citizens have become less politically involved and less aware of the
true meaning or impact of the initiatives upon which they vote." Most citi-
zens who do vote do not spend the time to educate themselves about the ini-
tiatives.tto Even if citizens do take the time to educate themselves, deceptive
STAND 32 (1992); see also David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democ-
racy: William Simon U'ren and- the Oregon System," 67 TomP. L REV. 947 (1994). Some are
fearful of what mass technology would mean to the process of direct democracy. Hamilton, supra
note 57, at 1. In the late 1970s, Jack Kemp advocated a national referendum in his book An
American Renaissance. JACK KEMP. AN AMEICAN RE IssANc . A STRATEGY FOR TilE 1980S
187-89 (1979).
96. See generally Fountaine, supra note 70, at 762-63; see also John C. Brittain, Direct
Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights of Minority or Other Powerless
Groups, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AMN. L 441, 446-47 (1996); see also Sutro, supra note 72, at 973-76.
97. See generally, Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy. 99 YALE U.
1503, 1522-30 (1990); see also Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct democracy. 112
HARv. L REv. 434 (1998); see also Symposium on the California Initiative process. 31 Loy. LA.
L REv. 1161 (1998); Symposium, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A
Concept Whose Tune Has Passed, or a Vigorous Competent of Participatory Democracy at the
State Level?, 28 NM. L REv. 227 (1998); see also Bell, supra note 82, at 23.
98. Vargas, supra note 27, at 505-13 (proposing a four part test in balancing minority and
majority rights under the direct democracy system).
99. The ballot pamphlet sent to voters before the election simply contains arguments for
and against the initiative. LEAGUE OF WoIN.E VoTERs, supra note 70. at 54. There is little real
analysis because the supporters of the initiatives and those organized against the initiative draft
the arguments in the ballot pamphlet. Moreover, the voters have to make numerous decisions per
election. This lack of real analysis and numerous decisions lessen the chances the voters are
making informed choices. Id. Furthermore, direct democracy is an inefficient form of govern-
ment. Brestoff, supra note 71, at 939-42; Fountaine, supra note 70, at 751. There are campaign
costs, state election costs, voter costs, and costs associated with court challenges. Fountaine,
supra note 70, at 751-54. See generally Sutro, supra note 72, at 966-76 (proposing only allowing
courts to use the ballot pamphlet as a means to deciphering voter intent after the pamphlet and
its use is reformed).
100. Those with high income, high education, and an interest in politics are more likely to
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advertising misleads them'01 and official ballot pamphlets that are written on a
reading level higher than most citizens attain.10e Mass deceptive advertising
and the advent of counter initiative,103 has led to the passage of inconsistent,
destructive, and in some cases oppressive laws. t°4
vote on initiatives. See Vargas, supra note 27, at 414. If the initiative is on the ballot during an
off year or during a primary election, the voter is more likely to be older, educated, financially
independent and more ideological. See Magleby, supra note 23, at 32 (citing LARRY M. BARTELS.
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 140-48 (1988); JAMES I. LENGLE.
REPRESENTATION AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE POST-REFORM ERA
15-26 (1981)). Voting on initiatives increases this disparity because poor, undereducated, and
younger voters usually skip ballot questions at much higher rates. See MAGLEBY. supra note 81,
at 105. In the 1990 general election more than 10% of voters bypassed the initiatives. William
Edicott, June Ballot Will Give Voters Only a Temporary Respite, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 14, 1992.
101. Supporters and those groups who oppose initiatives use advertising to appeal to vot-
ers' emotions by oversimplifying the issues and proposing simplistic solutions to complex issues.
See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 70, at 54. These groups use mass media, especially
radio and television; some even use celebrities to promote an affirmative or negative vote on the
initiative. Peter King, Commercial Litmus Test: Will TV Viewers Buy It?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1986, at A28. Some voters unabashedly admit their propensity for using the advertisement to de-
cide how to vote, rather than being truly educated on the initiative. Id.
102. The pamphlets between 1974 and 1980 were written at a reading level ranging from
the fourteenth to the eighteenth grade level. See MAGLEBY, supra note 81. at 120; LEAOUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 70. at 54. On the other hand, the average voter reads
only at the thirteenth grade level. Id. Voter pamphlet length is also an issue discouraging voter
participation. The lengthier a pamphlet, the more likely the voter will not read it. In 1988, the
voter pamphlet was 159 pages long and in 1990 the pamphlet was 224 pages long. Charles Price
& Robert Wast, Initiative: Too Much of a Good Thing?, CAL J., Mar. 1991, at 117. The length of
pamphlets seems to grow each year; the 1993 pamphlet was 236 pages long. See DuVivier, supra
note 22, at 1195. Criticism of the length of the pamphlet is nothing new. The pamphlet was criti-
cized in 1914 as being too complex and lengthy for the average voter who must work to make a
living. Id. Even the California Supreme Court recognizes the "sound-bite" nature of the ballot
language is "designed to win votes, not to present a thoughtful or precise explication of legal
tests or standards." Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 865 P.2d 633, 646 n.5 (1994).
103. The counter-initiative and other obfuscating devices confuse the voters. Such devices
include misleading initiative titles, dense and verbose initiatives, and of course the counter-
initiative. See Scheiber, supra note 21, at 815 (citing Bruce E. Cain et al., Constitutional
Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our State Constitution?, in CONSTruTIONAL REFORM IN CALI.
FORNIA 280-82 (1995)). David Magleby characterizes counter-initiatives as the latest step in
professionalization of the initiative process where groups pay large sums of money to get their
counter-initiative passed, but also spend huge sums to get the voters to cast their votes for their
initiative, not the competing initiative. See Magleby, supra note 23, at 24. The counter-initiative,
just as misleading of a title, can confuse voters into voting for an initiative not knowing that
their yes vote really means a no vote. This very thing occurred in California's 1980 rent control
initiative. Roger Smith & Dorothy Townsend, Proposition 10: Its Defeat Hailed and Lamented,
L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1980, at 1. But cf., DuVivier, supra note 22, at 1194 (arguing that counter-
initiatives can actually aid the education of voters by giving them more than just a yes or no
vote on one initiative).
104. Voters, unlike the legislature, are given one choice: either to vote for or against an in-
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C. Proposition 187: A Thoroughly Modem Initiative
On November 8, 1994, the people of California passed Proposition 187
by a margin of 59% to 4 1%.t0 The next day five lawsuits were filed chal-
lenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the newly enacted law.106
November 8 was the day of reckoning for a state with one of the nation's
most diverse populations.1t 7 It seemed that a new chapter in history had been
itiative. There is no planning commission or committee meetings to deliberate the value and ne-
cessity of the initiative. Tachner t City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 64 (1973). Nor is there an
opportunity to change or redraft the initiative once it enters the approval, signature-gathering
phase of qualification for the ballot. Legislators, on the other hand, are more likely to make in-
formed decisions because they have the tools that initiatives lack. They can debate a piece of
legislation and redraft it to properly reflect the needs and the best way to solve a problem. See
Fountaine, supra note 70, at 743. Moreover, if the electorate is disappointed with the decisions of
the legislator, he can be voted out in the next election. ld at 742. Direct democracy lacks such a
check. Many commentators criticize the lack of real options and uninformed voting inherent in
direct democracy. See Eule, supra note 97, at 1523-30; MAGLEBY. supra note 81. at 128.
Another issue with direct democracy is that it is superior and inferior to the power exercised
by the legislature. It is superior because the legislature cannot repeal or amend an initiative, un-
less the initiative so allows. CAL. CoNsT. art I, § 10(c). It is inferior because the legislature can
do more than legislate because it can pass resolutions, redistrict the state political boundaries, and
call for a federal constitutional convention. AFL-CIO it Eu. 36 Cal.3d 687, 714. 686 P.2d 609.
627 (Cal. 1984).
105. See Bradsher, supra note 3, at B11. California passed numerous anti-immigrant law.s
against the Chinese in the 1800s. These laws required extra fees for licenses, prohibited Chinese
from being witnesses at trials, and limited how and where they could work. See Chung, supra
note 44, at 269-75. California is not the only state shouldering the burden of immigrants. Other
states such as Florida, Arizona, Texas, and New Jersey sued the federal government for reim-
bursement of services they provided to illegal immigrants. Prodding Wishington an Immigration,
Prrrs. Posr-GAzErm, Jan. 6, 1995, at C3.
106. See League of United Latino American Citizens i Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755. 763 n3.
Those included League of United Latin American Citizens it Wilson (CV 94-7569 MRP), Chil-
dren Who Want an Education it Wilson (CV 94-7570 MRP), Ayala %t Pete B. Wilson (CV 94-
7571 MRP), Gregorio T v Wilson (CV 94-7652 MRP), and Carlos P t lWilson, (CV 95-0187).
Id. The District Court allowed several plaintiffs to intervene. d at 763. at n.2. Those parties in-
clude the City of Los Angeles, California Association of Catholic Hospitals and the Catholic
Health Association of the United States, California Teachers Association, American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Islamic Center of Southern California. Mus-
lim Public Affairs Council and California Council of Churches. IL See also Paul Feldman &
Amy Pyle, Wilson Acts to Enforce Parts of Prop. 187; 8 Lawsuits Filed, LA. Tv tas. Nov. 10.
1994, at Al. Soon after, an injunction was granted halting enforcement of Proposition 187. See
Feldman, supra note 48, at Al; League, 908 F. Supp. at 764.
107. California has seen significant immigration from Vietnam, Philippines. China, Taiwan.
India, Iran, Korea, Armenia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Mexico, Japan, Canada, Nicaragua. and
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written. 108 However, the issues Proposition 187 addressed were not new to
California. 1°9 California has a history of passing anti-alien laws especially
when economic times are poor."0
Thailand. Richard Sybert, Population, Immigration and Growth in California, 31 SAN DIEGO
L.REv. 945, 968 (1994). As of 1994, California had the largest foreign born population of any
state. Id. at 957. Population growth and the increase of unskilled laborers is seen as one of the
most important social issues facing California. Id. at 945-46.
108. The United States as well as the United Kingdom has long histories of exclusion of
aliens and discrimination based on immigration status. Kevin C. Wilson, And Stay Out! The Dan-
gers of Using Anti-Immigrant Sentiment as a Basis for Social Policy: America Should Take Heed
of Disturbing Lessons From Great Britain's Past, 24 GA. J. INT'L L. & CoMP. L. 567 (1995). All
great nations including the United States, Great Britain, and France have a history of oppressing
minority groups. See Barbara Nesbet & Sherilyn K. Sellgren, California's Proposition 187: A
Painful History Repeats Itself, 1 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L & POL'Y 153, 175 (1995). California has a
history of passing anti-alien laws. Voters approved the Alien Land Law, which limited land own-
ership to those legally in the state, in 1920. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 70, at
24. Moreover, in 1986, California voters passed the English only initiative. CAL. CONST. art. II, §
6.
To date thousands of newspaper articles and law reviews have been written about Proposi-
tion 187. When first passed and the injunction issued, it was seen as a certainty that the constitu-
tionality of Proposition 187 would result in an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
See Stacey Hardin, State Forays Into Immigration Law, "SOS": Can California 'Save Our State,'
34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAm.L. 195, 196 (1995).
109. See discussion of Chinese immigration in the 1800s supra note 44. California has
been struggling with immigration problems for most of its history. Id. The following legislative
finding was made on March 11, 1938:
WHEREAS, The presence of the alien in this county and his activities constitute a grave
problem that demands immediate attention of Congress; and WHEREAS, This alien ques-
tion directly affects every American Wage earner, employer and taxpayer, and forms the
basis for much of the current distress, expense and danger resulting from unemployment,
relief, crime and the activities of subversive minority group; and
* * * * WHEREAS, California, with a heavy relief burden on its hand, confronted
by a serious unemployment problem, already a victim of the alien criminal, gangster,
dope peddler is weary of the trials and distractions of the alien agitator; now, therefore,
be it ... That the Legislature of the State of California most respectfully urges and peti-
tions the President and the Congress of the United States to enact legislation [to] deal
with the alien problem ....
A.J. Res. 15, Leg. Sess., 1938 Cal. Laws. These findings could have easily been made this dec-
ade on the floor of the capital in Sacramento. Because California is not the only state grappling
with the influx of aliens, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde, is in favor
of a national version of Proposition 187. Hugh Dellios, Immigration Issue Complicated by Many
Immigrant Categories, CHtI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1995, at C4.
110. In 1920, California voters approved the Alien Land Law restricting the rights of
aliens who were ineligible for citizenship to acquire real property. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VO.
ERS, supra note 70, at 24; see also Chung, supra note 44, at 269-75. People's attitude about
aliens coincides with economic cycles. In economic good times, aliens are sought for their cheap
labor, but when the economy enters a recession, then aliens are shunned and bear the frustration
of citizens. See generally James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical
Examination of the United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 227, 235
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Regardless of history, Proposition 187 is a modem initiative because it
was well financed, played upon citizen's emotions, and pitted neighbor
against neighbor."' Even the origins of Proposition 187 are similar to the ori-
gins of so many other initiatives that pit majority against minority.112 Proposi-
tion 187 was based on fear, uncertainty and a desire to lash out against an
unresponsive federal government which was doing little to curb illegal immi-
gration.1 3 At the time Proposition 187 was passed, California was going
(1995).
111. See Morain, supra note 8. One of the most controversial portions of Proposition 187
would require school officials and others to report those whom they had a reasonable suspicion
to believe were in the United States illegally. See SEc. STATE. supra note 1, at 91-92 (spwcifically
sections 5(c), 6(c), 7(e), and 8(c)). Some argue that the reasonable suspicion portions of Proposi-
tion 187 violate the United States Constitution's right to privacy. See Hardin. supra note 103. at
200-09. Fearful of being reported to INS, two deaths occurred because those individuals did not
seek medical care when they should have. Pamela Burdman, Parents Blame Proposition 187
Fear in Son's Death, S.F. Ct0oN., Nov. 24, 1994, at Al; Pamela Burdman. ioman Who Feared
Proposition 187 Deportation Dies at S.E General, S.F. CItRo., Nov. 26. 1994, at A14.
112. Co-sponsor of Proposition 187, Barbara Coe's experiences are similar to those seen in
Florida's anti-gay movement. Ms. Coe went to help a disabled friend straighten out her medical
benefits. Stephen Kanter, et al., Proposition 187: A Debate on Californias Immigration Initiative,
7 Imr'L LEGAL PEas,'. 85, 86 (1995). Upon arriving at the benefits office, the English-speaking
window was closed. ld. She was upset because she saw what she perceived as "illegal immi-
grants" waiting in lines. Id. She started the campaign for Proposition 187 because her friend's
medical benefits were being discontinued, while all the "illegal aliens" were taking her friend's
benefits. Id.
113. Antonio Olivo, Some Foes of Prop. 187 Now Preach Compromise Politics. The New
Stance by Those Lawmakers Reflects Latinos' Differing Attitudes Toward Immigration, L.A.
Tams, May 11, 1999, at Al. Even supporters of Proposition 187 recognize that Governor Wilson
made Proposition 187 a race issue. Out of Purgatory Let 187's Appeals Begin Illegal Immigra-
tion, LA TmEs, Mar. 24, 1999, at B7.
The findings and declaration of section one of Proposition 187 declared that the citizens of
California had suffered long enough. Section one reads:
The People of California find and declare as follows:
That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the presence of il-
legal aliens in this state. That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and
damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state. That they have a
right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering this coun-
try unlawfully. Therefore, the People of California declare their intention to provide for
cooperation between their agencies of state and local government with the federal govern-
ment, and to establish a system of required notification by and between such agencies to
prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public services in the
State of California.
See SEc STATE. supra note 1. at 92; see also Prodding lW'ashington supra note 105. These find-
ings should be questioned because there were no hearings or any check on the validity of the
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through a difficult economic recession with more than eight percent unem-
ployment.' 4 Out of this economic recession, the people lashed out at those
unlike themselves: illegal aliens." 5 Playing on racial stereotypes, Proposition
187 and its media campaign blamed the economic strain on those illegally in
California. 16
As a result of this belief that illegal aliens were to blame for hard eco-
nomic times, a group of Californians drafted Proposition 187 to curb the al-
leged fiscal pressure illegal aliens placed on the state." 7 Believing that pro-
claims made. See Kanter, supra note 112, at 97.
114. In July of 1995, the unemployment rate in California was 7.9%, compared with the
national average of 5.7%. Tom Murphy Bloomberg, Lost Jobs Reflect Bumpy Economy, FRESNO
BEE, Aug. 5, 1995, at El. Between 1990 and 1993, 830,000 jobs were lost in California. Ronald
Brownstein & Richard Simon, Hospitality Turns Into Hostility for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
14, 1993, at Al. Such a decrease in jobs caused fear that illegal aliens were competing with citi-
zens for jobs. Id. This belief is generally erroneous because most illegal aliens are blue collar
workers who work for less than minimum wage. See generally Sybert, supra note 107, at 945.
Illegal aliens actually improve the economy by taking the lowest quality jobs and provide cheap
labor for big businesses, which helps to keep inflation rates low. Eric Bailey & Dan Morain,
Anti-Immigration Bills Flood Legislature, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A3. Some hoped the me-
diation of Proposition 187 would put the racial discord to rest and avoid "racial scapegoating the
next time California faces economic hardship." Olivo, supra note 113, at Al.
115. See Vargas, supra note 27, at 450. One alternative to Proposition 187, would be to
force the Federal government to compensate California for shouldering such a large portion of
immigrant population and to reform immigration law. See Sybert, supra note 107, at 949.
116. The advertisement campaigns were criticized as incorrect and unscientific because
they claimed aliens took more in government services than they paid in taxes. Michelle A. Hel-
ler, Stemming the 71de: Illegal Immigration into the U.S., HIsPANic, Apr. 1994, at 20, available it
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file. Racial stereotyping in the advertisement campaign is just one
problem because the origins of Proposition 187 come from anti-Latino hatred. Proposition 187
could have affected the various immigrant groups that immigrate to California, but would have
been enforced more against Latinos. The incident with Eddie Cortez, Mayor of Pomona, is a per-
fect example of the racial stereotyping that could have occurred if Proposition 187 had been en-
forced. Id. at 3. The Mayor was driving an old truck and was wearing overalls when he was pul-
led over and asked to produce immigration documents even though he is a third generation
American. Id. If Proposition 187 had been enforced, Eddie Cortez's experience could have be-
come commonplace.
117. The cost of social services used by immigrants is estimated to be $4.787 billion. See
Sybert, supra note 107, at 948 (citing California Department of Finance figures). One expert ar-
gues that while immigrants do not use social services more, the cost is more because of the
lower level of taxes paid. Il But cf, Mailman. infra note 122.
If the state argues that it's goal in Proposition 187 is to save money or to provide more ser-
vices for its citizens, then the Supreme Court could closely scrutinize the proposition. While the
Court defers to the state on social and economic regulation, it will not allow a law to pass the
rational basis test when it wholly excludes a class of persons from social services by arguing the
need to secure benefits for its own citizens. Doe v. Pyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 586 n.25 (E.D. Tex.
1978) (citing Dandridge v Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol1/iss2/1
[Vol. 1: 123, 2001]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
viding education and social services were the primary reasons individuals
immigrated to California, Proposition 187 sought to curb immigration by cut-
ting off those services to those who could not prove they were in the United
States legally."8 By denying these services and education, the drafters be-
lieved that immigration would lessen and save the state millions, when in fact
these provisions put billions of federal funding at stake.119 The drafters next
sought to deter those who aid aliens by criminalizing the practice of provid-
ing illegal aliens with forged immigration documents and punishing those
who possess them.1'- The drafters also required state law enforcement agen-
118. The District Court found that the provisions of Proposition 187 had the purpose of
deterring "illegal aliens from entering or remaining in the United States..." League, 90 F.
Supp. at 765. Since California controlsl10% of the votes in the House of Representatives. Cali-
fornia voters could have required their representatives to enforce the immigration laws. See
Kanter, supra note 112, at 106. A particularly harsh section of Proposition 187 would require the
parents of children attending school to prove their citizen status as a prerequisite for the child at-
tending, even if the child is a citizen of the United States. See SEC STATE. supra note 1. at 92.
and specifically section 7(d). The Supreme Court has held that since a child's eligibility as a citi-
zen is not dependent upon their parent's status, states could not deny rights to its citizens on the
basis of a member of the family being an illegal alien because to allow such would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Pyler it Doe, 457 U.S. 202. 210 (1982). Even if Proposition 187"s see-
tion 7 was constitutional on its face, it is doubtful it would be constitutional in practice. If the
parent is deported because of their status, then the child would have little choice but to go with
the parents. Such a result would violate the Equal Protection Clause because it would force a
class of citizens out of the country. See Doe t Miller, 573 F. Supp. 461, 466 (NJ). IlL 1983).
119. Proposition 187 would have saved S200 million to state and local governments, but
could have cost the state tens of millions to implement and risked losing $15 billion in federal
financing for public services that conflict with federal law. See SEc. STATE, supra note 1. at 50.
Proposition 187 is poorly drafted and is an oversimplification of the immigration crisis. Paul
Feldman, Figures Behind Prop. 187 Look at its Creation, LA Te.s. Dc. 14. 1994, at A3. A
district court judge called Proposition 187 poorly written because it looked as if different people
drafted the various sections. Paul Feldman, Forgers Get 6 Months in Prop. 187 Plea Bargain.
LA Tis as, Jan. 5, 1995, at BI.
120. Proposition 187 Sections 2 and 3 dealt with the manufacture, distribution and use of
false citizen documents. Section 2 provided:
Any person who manufactures, distributes, or sells false documents to conceal the true cit-
izenship or resident alien status of another person is guilty of a felony, and shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or by a fine of seventy-five thou-
sand dollars ($75,000).
See SEC STATE, supra note 1, at 91. Section 3 read:
Any person who uses false documents to conceal his or her true citizenship or resident
alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for five years of by a fine or twenty-five thousand dollars (S25.000).
Id.
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cies to cooperate with officers of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.' 2'
The supporters and drafters of Proposition 187 were fed up with the eco-
nomic recession and believed illegal aliens were at the root of the economic
downturn. 122 Some Californians were tired of the federal non-funded mandates
to provide for education and social services to all individuals present in the
state and the strain the mandates put on the economy. The supporters wanted
to send a message to the federal government that the voters of California
would no longer stand for the federal government's ignoring the illegal alien
problem and expecting Californians to shoulder the bill for social services for
illegal aliens.' 23 Unconcerned that many portions of the initiative violated fed-
eral immigration laws and the Constitution, supporters believed the time was
right to challenge such laws because of changed circumstances and
demographics of the United States Supreme Court. 24
Those who opposed Proposition 187 were adamant that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and that many portions were preempted by federal
immigration law.' 25 When the district court handed down its decision over a
121. Section four of Proposition 187 required law enforcement officers to cooperate with
the INS. Id. Section four required officers to report arrested persons to the INS if they suspected
them of "being present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws." Id. If the
officer reasonably suspected the individual was in the United States illegally he was to ascertain
the citizenship status of the individual, notify the individual that he must obtain legal status to be
legally present in the United States, notify the Attorney General of California and the INS of the
individual's apparent illegal status. Id.
122. In 1993, California had more than 40% of the total illegal alien population in the
United States. See Brownstein, supra note 114. Most illegal immigrants come to the United
States to work and are a great contribution to the economy. Stanley Mailman, Califonia's Pro-
position 187 and Its Lessons, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 3, 1995, at 3. These aliens also pay more in taxes
than they receive in government service. Id. But cf Sybert, supra note 107, at 948.
123. A New York Times investigation revealed that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service is one of the most poorly managed federal agencies. Daniel NV. Sutherland, Immigration's
Hard Problems and Easy Answers, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at A17.
124. See Lesher, supra note 9. Proposition 187 authors wrote it with the intent to chal-
lenge Plyler v. Doe. Id. Supporters argued that the court's demographics and the impact on the
schools warranted the challenge. Id. See Dan Stein, Entitlements for Undocumented Aliens: Is
California's Proposition 187 Constitutional? Yes: The Supreme Court Must Re-evaluate Existing
Law, 81 A.B.A. J. 42 (Feb. 1995)(arguing that the 30 years since Plyler has changed the court
and the circumstances of illegal immigration). But cf. Herman Schwartz, Entitlements for Un-
documented Aliens: Is California's Proposition 187 Constitutional? No: The Law is Clear, Only
the Court Has Changed, 81 A.B.A. J. 43 (Feb. 1995)(arguing that while the court's dynamics
have changed, Plyler would still carry the day).
125. See League, 908 F. Supp. at 764; see also SEC. STATE, supra note 1, at 55. Those
against Proposition 187 were concerned about turning 400,000 children onto the streets if Pro-
position 187 was enforced. SEC. STATE, supra note 1, at 55. They were also concerned about the
health risks associated with illegal aliens who would have been without health care, handling
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year after its passage, those who opposed Proposition 187 were mostly cor-
rect. 26 District Court Judge Pfaelzer found Proposition 187 to be poorly
drafted,127 violative of the Fourteenth Amendment via United States Supreme
Court case Plyler v. Doe,12s and predominately preempted by federal immigra-
tion laws. 29 The few provisions that remained intact were the criminal docu-
ment possession and distribution provisions 30 and the higher education
provision.' 3'
food in restaurants and in the fields. lit Those who opposed Proposition 187 hoped a "no" vote
would send a message to the politicians to enforce the law. lt Proposition 187 was opposed by
the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, California Teachers Association. and the California Medical
Association. Id.
126. The five lawsuits were consolidated into one action. League, 908 F. Supp. at 763.
127. One serious problem with Proposition 187 was its three vague categories of legal
aliens. See SEc_ STATE, supra note 1, at 91-92 (specifically §§ 5(b)(1-3). 6(b)(1-3), 7(dJ(1-3)).
Federal immigration law lists more than eight classes of legal aliens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(15)(A)-
(N) and 27(A)-(H) (1996). Judge Pfaelzer recognized this discrepancy and interpreted portions of
Proposition 187 as if it had adopted federal definitions of aliens in the hopes of validating part of
the newly passed law. See League, 908 F. Supp. at 770. Yet, she still held that federal immigra-
tion law preempted Proposition 187. ld. at 771.
128. League, 908 F. Supp. at 774. The district court found that not only were the immigra-
tion provisions of Proposition 187 section seven preempted by federal immigration law, the de-
nial of education to illegal aliens or children of illegal aliens, was also unconstitutional under
Plyler v. Doe. aL Consequently, the district court held that section seven conflicted entirely with
the Fourteenth Amendment and federal immigration law and therefore, %as preempted in its en-
tirety. a L
129. Federal immigration laws preempted all of the sections of Proposition 187 concerning
the classification of legal aliens. League, 908 F. Supp. at 768; see also note 127. In determining
whether federal law preempted Proposition 187, the district court applied the three-prong test de-
lineated in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). League, 908 F. Supp. at 768. The district
court held that the classifications of aliens under Proposition 187 contained in sections four
through nine, violated the first-prong of the DeCanas test because the classifications regulated
immigration. I& at 771, 775. The court found the classifications also violated the second-prong
of DeCanas because the classifications intruded into an area where Congress intended to occupy.
lIL at 775. The overriding reason the classifications were preempted was because the Immigration
and Naturalization Act mandated that the Act "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for de-
termining the deportability of an alien." League, 908 F. Supp. at 777 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)). Proposition 187's classifications would have "create[ld) a new, wholly independent pro-
cedure, pursuant to which state law enforcement, welfare, heath care and education officials-
rather than federal officials and immigration judges-are required to determine the deportability of
aliens and effect their deportation." Lc.
130. Because sections two and three did not violate or impede federal law, those sections
were not preempted. League, 908 F. Supp. at 786.
131. The district court held that the higher education section did not violate or conflict
with federal law, and except for the classification provisions, it was not preempted. d The
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Supporters of Proposition 187, including Governor Wilson, were ready to
appeal and challenge the district court's holdings.13 2 Supporters wanted to
challenge the ruling of a single district court judge, believing that the provi-
sions were salvageable because the time was right to appeal to the United
State Supreme Court. 3 3 The appeal was put on hold when the election in
1998 put Democratic candidate Gray Davis, who campaigned against wedge
and divisive politics, into the Governor's office.' 34 Governor Davis faced an
unusual quandary because he was clearly anti-187 in 1994, but he was faced
with defending it on appeal. 35 Claiming he had a constitutional mandate to
appeal, 36 Governor Davis decided to seek the aid of the Settlement Program
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rather than seeking a full appeal in
front of the Ninth Circuit justices137 Both supporters and opponents of Pro-
position 187 heavily criticized Governor Davis for his decision. 38 When the
higher education section seemed to be less at issue because many colleges and universities al-
ready have requirements for proof of alien status and charge more for tuition if the student can-
not establish legal residency. Id
132. Steven J. Gorman, Analysts: Prop. 187 Ruling Legally Sound, L.A. DAILY NIws, Nov.
22, 1995, at NI. Wilson called the District Court's decision "fundamentally flawed." Dennis An-
derson, Judge Throws Out Rest of Prop. 187, Wilson Vows to Appeal Ruling on Immigrant Aid
Measure, L.A. DAILY NEws, Mar. 19, 1998, N3. Wilson also stated that the District Court's deci-
sion would allow for appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the will of the people.
Id; see also Ron Prince, Commentary, Out of Purgatory, Let 187's Appeals Begin, Illegal lmni-
gration, LA. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1998, at B7.
133. Wilson vowed to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court if necessary.
See Gorman, supra note 132. Governor Wilson recognized that the appellate process is lengthy
and the quickest chance of reform would come from Congress. Id. Governor Wilson's prediction
was correct because the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 denied federally funded social services to
illegal aliens. See Lesher, supra note 9; see supra note 4.
134. Gubernatorial candidate Davis campaigned against wedge politics at every stop during
his campaign tour. See Lesher supra note 9.
135. See supra note 4. Governor Davis says he thinks the law is unconstitutional, but also
believes he must defend the measure on appeal to uphold his constitutional duty. See Lesher
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 9.
137. Robert B. Gunnison, U.S. Court Asked to Mediate Prop. 187, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr.
16, 1999, at A21; see also supra note 4. The Governor announced mediation of Proposition 187
on April 15, 1999. See Hardy, supra note 4. After dropping the education issue, an optimistic
Governor Davis stated that federal law and court decisions on the educational issue gave him
grounds to resolve the educational issue before mediation. See Dave Lesher, Davis Won't Follow
Prop. 187 on Schools Politics: Governor Vows Not to Implement Provision That Would Deny Ille-
gal Immigrant Children Access to Public Education, L.A. TaMEs, May 21, 1999, at Al.
138. See supra note 6 and 7 and accompanying text; see also Lesher, supra note 9; Gunni-
son supra note 137. Opponents argued that the Governor should drop the appeal. See Gunnison
supra note 137. While supporters of Proposition 187 blasted the Governor for delaying the ap-
peal and acting with unconstitutional authority because the Governor was not seeking a full ap-
peal, the most vocal opponent to the Governor's decision to mediate was the Lieutenant Gover-
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Settlement Program decided to mediate the appeal, Proposition 187 became
the first Proposition to go to mediation. 39 In August 1999, when the media-
tion ended in a settlement, Proposition 187 became the first Proposition to be
resolved by mediation.t14
I. RISE OF MEDIATION AS A COURT SPONSORED TOOL TO RESOLVE
DISPUTES AND THE FUTURE OF MEDIATED INITIATIVES
Mediation is one of the many processes in the ADR movement.' 4' The
courts have embraced mediation above all other ADR tools to resolve dis-
putes ranging from custody issues to complex litigation involving government
regulation. 42 Mediation can empower the parties to resolve their dispute to-
gether without having to go to trial' t43 The mediator's role is to help the par-
nor Cruz Bustamante. Ed Mendel, Bustarnante Widens Split with Davis on 187, SAN DIEGO
UNmoN-TRrm., Apr. 21, 1999, at A3. The Lieutenant Governor planned to file a legal brief arguing
the Court of Appeals should drop the appeal. itL
139. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. Mediation is a procedure in which the mediator tries to help disputing parties reach
agreement and in which the mediator has little or no authority to impose a decision if the parties
do not reach an agreement CHRiSToPHER NV. MOORE. THE MEDIATION PROcESS: PRACTnCAL STRAT-
EGiEs FOR RESOLVING Co,*ucr 8. 41-53 (1996).
142. Mediation has been used to resolve conflicts such as landlord-tenant. debtor and cred-
itor, and family matters. James J. Alfini, Evaluation Versus Facilitation Mediation: A Discussion.
24 FLA. ST. U.L REv. 919, 921, 924, 934 (1997). Mediation has been successful in helping par-
ties resolve a broad range of issues from international conflicts to neighborhood disputes, See
ELIZABETH PAPLINGER. ET AL. ADR AND SEr.E!MENT IN THE FEDERAL Drsucr CourTs: A
SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS, 3 (1996); see also PErR LoVENHEIM. MwEim. DoN'T Lrr.
IGATE 8-9 (1989). Mediation is also used outside the court system to solve disputes in schools, at
work, and in churches. See id. at 19. The President of the United States uses mediators to resolve
international disputes. Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation, 24
FLA. ST. U.L Rev. 903 (1997). The most well known meditations involve baseball where the
players and owners resolve the players' salary disputes. Lc.
143. Some see empowerment mediation as the key to settlement because it helps the par-
ties to better understand their goals, options, and resources by making informed decisions. Roa-
ERT A BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER. THE PROuSE OF MEDIATIO. RESPONDING TO Co. ucrr
THROUGH EMPowERENT AND RECoGNIToN 86-87 (1994). A mediator's evauation of the party's
case, if done right, can be helpful in evaluating particular options. Id. at 874; PLIN,;. supra
note 142, at 1. This evaluative style is sometimes seen as coercive because the mediator pres-
sures the parties to accept settlement options over others. John Lande, Howv Will Lzmyering and
Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 F. ST. U.L REv. 839, 864 (1997). But cf.
Lavinia E. Hall & Eric Green, Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes, in VILN
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ties communicate and facilitate a dialog ending in a mutually agreeable settle-
ment.I44 Mediators can be facilitative where they merely assist the parties
resolve their conflict, 145 or they can be more evaluative by providing the par-
ties a reality check by expressing their opinion about the probability of suc-
cess at trial. 146 Mediation has been successful in resolving a variety of dis-
putes at the trial level. 147
Recently, following the success of the trial court programs, most appel-
late courts on the state and federal level have instituted some type of settle-
ment program to combat increased filings. 14 Most of these programs utilize a
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 279, 306 (1994).
144. A facilitative mediator would "encourage [the] parties to examine and articulate un-
derlying interests, recognize common interests and complimentary goals, and engage in creative
problem solving to find resolution acceptable and optimal for all parties." Kimberlee K. Kovach
& Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALT. TO HIGH COST OF LITIOATION,
31, 32 (1996).
145. Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 937, 939 (1997). Facilitative mediators are concerned with the quality, expertise, and
soundness of the evaluative mediator's advice. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False
Dichotomies, The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 949, 958 (1997). While Florida state courts have adopted a purely facilitative
model, some critics warn that facilitative mediation has out lived its usefulness. Id. at 954-56.
The most popular mediators use some type of evaluative technique. Id. at 973. Some evaluative
mediators are concerned about the increased potential harm if one party is less savvy about the
process than the other party. Id. at 976-77.
146. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. Expert negotiator and mediator, William
Ury advocates careful evaluative mediation. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR
WAY FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 130-56 (1993). Some evaluatative mediators balk at
the argument that evaluative mediation is an "oxymoron." John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator
Responds, 14 ALT. HIGH COST LITIGATION 70 (June 1996). On the other hand, some argue that a
mediator should only offer his opinion if there is an "insurmountable settlement gap" between
parties on the effect of settlement. Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwvire Art of
Evaluation, 14 ALT. HIGH COST LmGATION 62 (May 1996).
147. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Florida state trial courts have adopted a
true facilitative model of mediation. See Stempel, supra note 145, at 960. Facilitative mediators
can help the parties in evaluating their case, position, or argument by having the parties question
assumptions and positions and reexamine their interests. See Love, suspra note 145, at 939. But
cf. James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tenta-
tive Proposals From an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774-79 (1997).
148. ROBERT J. NIEMIC. MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 1, 2 n.4 (1997). Most of these programs are
a result of the passage of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 33 in 1994. Id. Under
Rule 33, the court may direct parties and attorneys to participate in a settlement conference run
by another judge or other person the court designates. FRAP Rule 33. Many state appellate
courts have established settlement programs utilizing ADR. Michael J. Wilkins and Karin S.
Hobbs, Utah's Appellate Mediation Office Opens January 1998: A New Option for Case Resolu.
tion at the Utah Court of Appeals, 10 UTAH BJ. 25 (Dec. 1997); MASSACHUSETrS CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, APPELLATE PRACrICE IN MASSACHUSETTS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
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neutral third party, such as a mediator, to aid the parties in hopes of ending
the dispute before oral arguments. 149 There are many types of appellate settle-
ment programs, but they have all been successful in resolving disputes.1sO The
true level of success of these programs is hard to determine because many of
the programs pre-select cases that seem to have a high likelihood for settle-
ment.'5 On the other hand, some programs require mandatory participation or
permit mediation if one of the parties requests.'- Just as trial level mediation
has become a popular alternative to resolving disputes, appellate programs are
likely to become more popular as more parties and attorneys become familiar
with the programs. 5 3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Settlement Program's established in
1984, mediated Proposition 187.55 The settlement office prescreens and
selects cases that seem more amenable to participation in the program based
upon the Civil Appeals Docketing Statement. 5 6 The Settlement Program
prescreened and rejected Proposition 187, but when Governor Davis inherited
the appeal, he requested that the program be used.'5 While participation is
mandatory, all parties must agree upon the final resolution to either settle or
proceed to appeal. 58 Through the Settlement Program, the parties found a
AT THE APPELLATE LEvEL 1 (1996).
149. Nmuc, supra note 148, at 12-16 (outlining mediation use among federal circuit
courts).
150. Ld. See generally Irving R. Kaufman. Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut? The Civil
Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE LI. 755 (1985-86)(discussing the success of court-sponsored
mediation in the appellate process).
151. NmIIc, supra note 148, at 11.
152. Only the Federal Circuit requires mandatory participation in a preheating settlement
discussion. Nmnc, supra note 148, at 16. The Seventh Circuit selects one in every five appeals
to participate in a settlement conference. I at 14. The remaining circuits prescren the appeals
for participants based on their settlement potential. d at 12-16.
153. S. Gale Dick, The Surprising Success of Appellate Mediation, 13 ALTERLNATtvEs To
IGH Cost LrnG. 41 (Apr. 1995). Some of the appellate programs pre-date the trial court settle-
ment programs. Id
154. Appellate Court Agrees to Mediate Prop. 187. LA. T.tEs, Apr. 27. 1999. at A26.
155. NiEsuc, supra note 148, at 72. Nationwide between 1994 and 1995. 401 of all eligi-
ble cases were selected to participate in some type of settlement program. d
156. The clerk's office forwards the Civil Appeals Docketing Statement to the Settlement
Program Office. Nt.,ttc, supra note 148, at 73. This statement includes information on a wide
variety of topics including nature of action and issues on appeal. Id
157. Five percent of cases processed by the Settlement Office come as requests by the par-
ties to participate. Ntasc, supra note 148, at 74.
158. If settlement is not reached, the mediator will work with the parties and counsel to
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mutually satisfying solution to the conflict over Proposition 187.159 After
many months of conference-call discussions, all parties agreed to a resolution
of Proposition 187 where the Governor would drop the appeal and only en-
force Proposition 187's criminal provisions. 60 Many critics were disappointed
in the resolution, while others were encouraged by the success of the program
with such a difficult appeal.161
Many scholars question the validity of a settlement program to end a
dispute over an initiative, 62 but the Supreme Court of California agreed to al-
low the settlement program to aid in resolution of Proposition 187.163 Sup-
porters of Proposition 187 were concerned that their position would not be
adequately represented; they believed that if the Governor was truly against
the Proposition, he would not zealously guard the will of the people and de-
fend it. 64 However, the mediation of Proposition 187 was unique in many re-
spects. First, Proposition 187 became the first initiative to settle via media-
tion. 165 Second, the parties on both sides did not seem to be opposed because
Governor Davis has always been anti-Proposition 187.66 Third, the mediation
did not set precedent for future immigration challenges because no judicial
opinion was written to establish stare decisis. What this uniqueness will mean
for future initiatives will be examined in Part D.
167
establish a schedule for the remainder of the case and files an order releasing the case from the
Settlement Program. NIEMIc, supra note 148, at 77.
159. See infra note 297.
160. Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles
Litigation: Governor's Deal with Civil Rights Groups Effectively Kills 1994 Anti-Illegal Immi-
grant Measure, Accord is Likely to Ignite Further Controversy, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at Al.
161. Terry McDermott, Some Are Embittered by Fate of Prop. 187 Politics: Fervent Back-
ers of Anti-immigration Measure Express Rage at its Demise and Want to Recall Gov. Davis,
L.A. TImiEs, Aug. 2, 1999, at Al; see also Antonio Olivo, Some Foes of Prop. 187 Now Preach
Compromise Politics: The New Stance by Those Lawmakers Reflects Latinos' Differing Attitudes
Toward Immigration, L.A. TIMEs, May 11, 1999, at Al.
162. Dan Morain, Debate Rises on Mediation of Proposition 187, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 20,
1999, at Al. One critic stated that the Proposition is either "constitutional or not," leaving no
room for negotiation. Id.
163. High Court Refitses to Block Prop. 187 Mediation Effort, L.A. TIMEs, July 2, 1999, at
A26.
164. Deal Struck to End Litigation Over Immigrant Aid, A.P. NEwswRES, July 29, 1999.
Sharon Browne of the Pacific Legal Foundation stated that the mediation left "Proposition 187
basically undefended." Id.; see also Ed Mendel, Bustamante Widens Split With Davis on 187,
SAN DIEGO U. TRta., Apr. 21, 1999, at A3 (stating that supporters fear no one would defend the
initiative's integrity).
165. Deal Struck to End Litigation Over Immigrant Aid, supra note 164.
166. McDermott, supra note 161.
167. See infra notes 314-54 and accompanying text.
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A. Mediation - A Popular Device of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mediation is a process that helps the parties come to an agreement re-
garding their dispute with the aid of a neutral third partylf3 Mediation and
other forms of ADR gained popularity in state trial courts in the 1980s due to
over worked judges and heavy court dockets.169 The goal of these programs is
successful resolutions of conflicts while avoiding the time and expense of a
trial.170 Mediation and other programs have been successful in resolving dis-
putes before trial.17'
Most courts have some type of alternative process to help settle cases.
Depending upon the court, many programs can be voluntary or mandatory.172
168. One of the primary goals of mediation is to empower the pauties to reach a mutually
satisfying result. Lande, supra note 143. at 858. The use of empowering mediation is an emerg-
ing style that is not without its critics, but is viewed as a byproduct to the institutionalization of
settlement-oriented mediation. ld. Empowerment and evaluative mediation are both more likely to
occur in court-sponsored mediation, as its goal is to settle cases. Id. These styles involve the me-
diator as an evaluator which also involves gently pushing parties to settle. Id See also Busit &
FoLGER, supra note 143. Bush and Folger are one of the most vocal and prolific advocates of the
empowerment style. See generally Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ideology. Orienta-
tions to Conflict Mediation Discourse, in NE~v Dmicro.s iN MEDIATMON (1994); see also Joseph
P. Folger & Robert A. Barnch Bush, Transformative Mediation and Third Pon.y Intervention: Ten
Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 M.DIArIoN Q. 263 (1996) (articulating
common practices among successful mediators).
169. Lande, supra note 143, at 841; see also Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California
Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L REV. 343, 365 (1992). California courts are bom-
barded with more cases and an increasing number of complex cases. Id. at 397. Some see the
modem ADR movement as a by-product of society's dissatisfaction with litigation. Stempel,
supra note 145, at 970.
170. Since the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Federal District
Courts have all been required to develop a cost and delay reduction plan for civil cases. 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-82. The CJRA includes ADR as a management tool. Id. Many cases are now me-
diated well before trial, thus avoiding costs of future litigation. PALINtoam supra note 142, at 10-
11 (discussing sample mediation fees).
171. Based on a survey of the federal district courts, mediation and other tools handle a
large caseload. PAu'IGm, supra note 142, at 6, 29-57 tbls. 3-7. This survey should be carefully
examined because many of the courts do not formalized reporting systems. Id. at 6.
172. The district courts have mandatory and voluntary programs. PALINGER', supra note
142, at 36-48, tbl. 4. The California District Courts have both voluntary and mandatory pro-
grams. Id. Central District of California has established Local Rule 23 that requires parties to
meet with a judge, settlement officer, or private mediator forty-five days before the final pre-trial
conference. Id. at 80. The Eastern District of California has established a voluntary Early Neutral
Evaluation (ENE) program via Local Rule 252. ld at 88. Under ENE, the third party helps the
parties examine the strengths and weaknesses of their case. Id. The Northern District Court of
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Most of these programs involve a third party who assists the participants in
their resolution of their case. 17 Depending upon the program, this neutral
third party can be: a court volunteer, an attorney or even an expert in the
field of the particular dispute. 74 These neutral third parties have many differ-
ent styles and approaches to settling disputes.1 75 Regardless of the background
and style of the third party, his or her goal is to help the parties come to a
resolution. 76 The third party will have to overcome many obstacles to attain
this goal. 17 7 First, the third party will have to bring parties together for a dia-
log when the parties are clearly having a dispute. 17 There may be trust, legit-
imacy, and other issues that must be addressed and overcome for a successful
mediation.179
California has adopted an ADR Multi-Option Program under Local Rule 3 where all civil cases
are required to participate in mediation, arbitration, ENE, or see a Magistrate Judge for a settle-
ment conference. Id. at 90. The Southern District of California has established an ENE where the
parties meet with a magistrate soon after responsive pleadings are filed. Id. at 103. The parties in
the Souther District may later opt into or be ordered to participate in mediation, arbitration, mini-
trial, or summary jury trial under Local Rule 16.1. Id. ENE has a staff which handles the daily
workings of the program which has formalized procedures for use of ADR. Id. at 11.
173. See supra note 168; see also PALPINGER, supra note 142, at 9, 29-57, tbls. 3-7 (dis-
cussing the reliance on third-party neutrals).
174. Id. Some state programs such as Florida's have established specific training and expe-
rience guidelines for court mediators. Press, supra note 142, at 915.
175. Lande, supra note 143, at 845, 850. With the increase in popularity of mediation,
many critics believe that there should be only one model of mediation, presumably so that when
parties request or courts order them to mediation, they know what to expect. Id. at 854. With the
institutionalization of mediation and its different styles, this uniformity is difficult and unlikely.
Id. at 855. One alternative is to clearly define the different styles and varieties of mediation in
ways that would be clearly and easily understood by the parties. Id.
176. While some mediators and attorneys assume that they know their goals and discussion
of these issues are unnecessary, they are frequently mistaken and benefit from goal and interest
discussions. Lande, supra note 143, at 871. There are at least four goal topic areas that should be
explored including litigation issues, business interests, personal/professional/relational interests
and community interests. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEcOTIATON L REV. 7, 18-23 (1996). In or-
der to reach the parties' goals, the mediator and parties must establish trust at the start of the me-
diation via their actions and statements, which should continue throughout the mediation. See id.
177. Some parties may come into the mediation on attack and do not realize it because
they are too close to the situation. URY, supra note 146, at 39. The mediator can put an end to
the attack and alleviate its impact by recognizing it, informing the parties, taking a break, clarify-
ing the problem, and discouraging rushed decision-making. Id. at 41-51.
178. The mediator will have to bridge the gap that exists between the parties. This bridg-
ing can occur by encouraging active listening, paraphrasing, acknowledging feelings and posi-
tions, projecting confidence, acknowledging competence and authority, and expressing optimism
on overcoming differences. URY, supra note 146, at 72. The mediator can help the parties get to
problem solving by probing the parties by asking them "why," "why not," "what if, .... what
makes it fair," and asking for advice. Id. at 80-87.
179. MooRE, supra note 141, at 174-77, 214. See infra note 182 for a discussion on legiti-
32
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol1/iss2/1
[Vol. 1: 123, 2001]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
Since the majority of programs utilize mediation, the remainder of this
section will address mediation and the process of mediation. While the nuts
and bolts of mediation is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to
understand the role of the mediator to analyze the impact mediation had on
the settlement of Proposition 187. In general, the mediator is able to over-
come many problems the parties have been experiencing because the mediator
is a neutral third party who can bring a fresh perspective. ta Oftentimes, the
parties and attorneys 81 have preconceived notions of the positive value of
their case and the related negative perception of the opponent's case.182 A
successful mediator will be able to bring the parties together, help them see
the value of the other party's perspective, and help guide them to their own
resolution, usually a dollar amount. Sometimes a non-monetary resolution can
macy. Lack of trust can be a large roadblock to a successful mediation. Moonc, supra note 141,
at 129. The parties must be able to "depend on or place confidence in the truthfulness or accu-
racy of another's statements or behavior." I& The mediation process itself can serve as a key
role in increasing trust, I
180. URY, supra note 146, at 130-56. The mediator is usually a neutral third party with no
stake in the outcome. See supra notes 168 and 177. As such the mediator can use his experience
and neutrality to educate. I& at 132-33. The mediator can also educate the parties on the conse-
quences by asking "reality" testing questions learned via mediator experience. Id. at 134-36.
181. The role of the attorney in a mediation can be confusing for the attorney and the par-
ties. An attorney is an advocate and as such may affect the outcome of the mediation. Lande.
supra note 143, at 883. At a mediation the attorney may do most of the talking. make state-
ments, and comment on the viability of settlement options - all in lieu of client participation. hIc
Another problem facing the attorney and mediation is the attorney's lack of time due to the fact
that the attorney often has other hearings and meetings that encroach upon or cut a mediation
short. Id at 887. Attorneys can have a major impact on the relationship between mediation and
litigation in the emerging liti-mediation culture, where many attorneys now save their settlement
efforts until mediation when the case could have been settled earlier. I at 891. It is advisable
for a mediator to set the parameters of the attorney's role in the mediation at the onset of the
mediation. Id at 884. One solution to several of these problems is for the attorney to become
more educated about mediation and different mediation styles and options, and allow the client to
participate more in mediation. Id. at 896-97.
182. This overconfidence may present a legitimacy issue. MooRE, supra note 141. at 174.
The party may accept his own position and interest as legitimate, but deny opponent's opinion.
interests, or emotions are legitimate. i Some of the legitimacy issues can be resolved by the
mediator's redefining the issues, having another person mediate in lieu of a particular party, be-
ing more specific or general when warranted, or focusing on an issue that could be recognized as
legitimate. Id. at 176. The parties and attorneys may also bring stereotypes and misperceptions to
the bargaining table. Id. at 169. The mediator will need to address these issues and overcome
them if the mediation is to be successful. Id
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be just as satisfying.'83 The success of mediation is a reflection on its ability
to recognize there are many reasons behind a lawsuit. The parties are obvi-
ously disagreeing on some legal right, but the reason the disagreement re-
sulted in a lawsuit, and what the parties hope to gain, is a facet that litigation
and judicial resolution often misses.1M
In order for a mediator to be successful, he must bring the parties to-
gether. Unification is not an easy task. The mediator must use all of his expe-
rience to help him achieve this goal. 85 To help identify the underlying issues
and to help the parties achieve their goal; the mediator frequently must pro-
gress through many stages. 186 The mediator will move through these stages
until the mediation attains ultimate resolution.'7
The mediator's task of bringing the parties together begins as soon as the
party's select or the court orders the parties to mediation. 88 The mediator ed-
183. Every dispute has several issues and sub issues that take time and a commitment to
reveal. Lande, supra note 143, at 872-73, 876. The mediator must be willing to spend such time
as necessary in assisting the parties to unearth these issues so that all options may be considered
in settlement. Id.
184. A judge does not focus on the how or the why of a dispute between the parties, while
ADR processes are usually focused on such issues. EDWARD J. BERGMAN & JOHN G. BICKERMAN.
COURT ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PRO.
GRAMS viii (1998). A mediator is able to change with the parties as they progress through the
resolution of their dispute. As parties participate in dispute resolution their attitudes, values, and
interests change and the mediator is flexible enough to change as the parties change. Stempel,
supra note 145, at 980-81. Mediation gives parties a new avenue to solve disputes in a creative
way while still providing a reference to the viability of options and outcome should the case end
in litigation after all. Id. at 982-83. Moreover, mediation gives parties access to information they
would not have received otherwise. Id All these reasons make mediation more flexible and re-
sponsive to parties' needs than judicial resolution of cases.
185. See supra note 174; MooRE, supra note 141, at 55, tbls. 1,2. Depending upon the
style of the mediator and how the mediator is selected, the mediator may know the parties per-
sonally or professionally or may be impartial and neutral. Id.
186. MooRE, supra note 141, at 63. Mediators can blend together many of the stages or
emphasize them depending upon the mediator's style or approach. Id. There can be many obsta-
cles to getting the parties to agree to a settlement. URY, supra note 146, at 107. The mediator
can help the parties build a bridge. Id. at 109. This bridge can be built by helping the parties to
see the other side's perspective. Id. at 110-11. The mediator can do this by asking for construc-
tive criticism, giving the parties a choice, and trying to establish a plan that addresses unmet in-
terests. Id. at 110-16. An important aspect of this is to not simply dismiss the parties and their
position as irrational. Id. at 116. Mediators should encourage the parties to put themselves in the
opposing party's shoes. Id. The bridge can also be built by not overlooking basic human needs
and intangible goals. Id. These intangible goals can be unearthed during a caucus. See infra notes
195 and 196.
187. LINDA R. SINGER. SETTLING DIspuTEs: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES.
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 22 (1990).
188. PAUL MICHAEL LISNE, A LAWYER'S GUIDE To EFFEcTIvE NEGOTIATION & MEDIATION
117 (1993): MOORE supra note 141, at 66, 81-98; SINGER, supra note 187, at 22-23.
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ucates the parties and attorneys about the mediation process.'" In return the
parties educate the mediator about the dispute.190 The mediator starts to build
trust and cooperation by expressing a readiness to handle strong emotions,
check perceptions, and clarify communications.' 9' Many of these initial stages
are done before the bargaining stage of the mediation.
Once the mediation begins, the mediator starts on a positive and open
note by establishing the ground rules for behavior.92 During the mediation,
the mediator may help the parties vent emotions, limit or expand topic areas
as needed, and then establish a plan for issues for the remainder of the medi-
ation. 93 By exploring issues and settling on an agenda, the mediator will
hopefully be able to unearth hidden interests of the parties and help the par-
ties bring those interests to the attention of the other side.'9 Discovering hid-
den interests is difficult and the mediator may use individual meetings with
each side called caucuses to enable the party to express himself freely with-
out the presence of the opposing side. 95 In the interests of fairness, if the me-
diator has a caucus with one party, he will caucus with the other party as
well.'9
At this point in the mediation, settlement options may begin to be pro-
189. MooRE supra note 141, at 66; SmGER, supra note 187, at 23; Lts.j,. supra note 188.
at 117-18.
190. MooRE supra note 141, at 66, 114; Lis,aTK supra note 188. at 120.
191. MOORE supra note 141, at 66.
192. MooRE supra note 141, at 66, 193; Leonard L Riskin. Mediation Training Guide. in
DispturE R.SOLUTION AND LAWYERS 342-44 (1997); LtSNEK, supra note 188. at 117-20;
LovENHmi, supra note 142, at 81-86.
193. MOoRE supra note 141, at 66, 231; LtsT-.g supra note 188, at 23-28; Rstast. supra
note 177, at 348.
194. See supra note 186; SwGER, supra note 187, at 23; Lis. x, supra note 188. at 129;
Lovenan, supra note 142, at 91-96; RISKiN. supra note 177. at 348.
195. A caucus is when a mediator meets separately with one side. Lande. supra note 143.
at 863 n.116. The caucus can be an effective tool by allowing the parties separate time with m.-
diator to explore options and underlying issues. Mi The mediator can use a caucus to meet just
with the parties, attorneys, or both. it; see also, SiNGER. supra note 187. at 23: LOVEmitn,.
supra note 142, at 95-97; RisluN, supra note 177, at 345.
196. Aaron, supra note 146, at 62. By having a caucus, the mediator is able to decide the
best method to deliver a message to a party. Id. The caucus can be especially helpful when one
party is culturally or ethnically different from the opposing party. ld. If the mediator is going to
evaluate the party's case, a caucus would give the mediator the opportunity to do so without
causing the party to lose face. Ida
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posed. 97 At this stage, the mediator's role is to help the parties realize the vi-
ability of the options. 198 There is a great deal of disagreement in the media-
tion community about the role of the mediator either to be a true facilitator
- as a tool to help the parties realize the value of their options,199 or to be
an evaluator - as a tool to evaluate the viability of success of an option ad-
vocated by one side.200 While such a dichotomy is interesting, it is beyond the
scope of this article. However, most appellate programs focus on settlement.
As such, most mediators use some sort of evaluative feedback to educate the
parties on the success of settlement options. 20°
After settlement options are enumerated, the parties will assess the op-
tions by analyzing how the various options meet their interests and the costs
or benefits to the various options.2 2 At this point, the mediation either moves
197. MOORE, supra note 141, at 244; RtsIN, supra note 177, at 350-51.
198. See supra note 176, 186-87; MOORE, supra note 141, at 269. If the mediator is going
to evaluate the various options, it is advisable that the mediator conduct such evaluation in a cau-
cus, while providing positive and negative feedback to both sides, remaining objective, and
presenting the evaluation in a logical fashion. Aaron, supra note 146, at 63. The mediator should
help the parties to realize that the mediator's evaluation is not the final determination of the
value of their case, but merely sets a range for settlement. Id. at 64; RIstIN, supra note 177, at
350-51.
199. Facilitative mediators focus on getting the parties to voice their own opinion and usu-
ally refrain from making comments about viable settlement options. Riskin, supra note 161, at
24. For an excellent discussion on the merits and drawbacks of each style see Alfini, supra note
142.
200. An evaluative mediator walks a fine line in not pressuring the parties to settle for set-
tlement's sake. Lande, supra note 143, at 877. Ultimately, the parties must take responsibility for
the decision whether to settle or not. Id. To that end, the mediator should double check the will-
ingness of the parties to settle on a particular option and not allow shortness of time to dictate a
sloppy or haphazard settlement. Id. at 877-78. Evaluative mediators help the parties formulate
settlement options and encourage or influence the parties to accept them. Riskin, supra note 161,
at 23-24. Michigan mediation has been successful in combining both styles of mediation. Lau-
rence P. Connor, How to Combine Facilitation with Evaluation, 14 ALT. HIGH COST OF LM'GA.
toN, 15 (1996). Michigan mediation begins as facilitative and then evolves into an evaluative
mediation as the mediation progresses. Id. Changing style mid-mediation can sometimes aid in
depolarizing stagnated positions. Id.
201. MOORE, supra note 141, at 263, 269. Scholars attribute the origins of evaluative me-
diation to the rise of court-sponsored mediation. Civic, supra note 132, at 32. Critics are con-
cerned that the judicial "arm-twisting" and advocacy of attorney has pervaded mediation and
changed mediation from "true" mediation. Id.
202. MOORE, supra note 141, at 269. The parties must review their interests and determine
how each settlement option meets those interests, Id. The party may realize that some interests
are less important than others. Id. Consequently, the parties may begin to modify, combine, or
trade the options until a final agreement is met. Id. For a complete discussion of settlement op-
tions and the stages of settlement, MooRE, supra note 141, at 270-78; RISKIN, supra note 177, at
352-53.
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to final bargaining0 3 or ends unsuccessfully.? The mediation that moves into
final bargaining will either do so via small steps or, sometimes, giant leaps of
compromise to settle the dispute.20 5 Getting the parties to trade these items
can go far in building the bridge to agreement.206 Breaking the mediation
down into small steps and guiding the parties through these steps slowly, can
help the parties reach their goal quickly without losing faith.? 7 The last step
is to memorialize the agreement and establish any mechanisms for evaluation
and completion of the agreement t t t
Mediation is an exciting, empowering ADR device that helps parties
come to their own resolution. The courts have successfully adopted mediation
and other tools to help decrease its ever increasing case load.--' While media-
tion may have some negative aspects,210 most participants are satisfied with
the overall process and resolution.21
203. MooR, supra note 141, at 67, 280; Lovnm., supra note 142. at 100-02: Rism.
supra note 177, at 353.
204. See supra note 158.
205. Sometimes it is necessary to go slow in order to go fast. URY. supra note 146. at
124. In building the bridge to settlement, the mediator should not assume a fixed pie. l at 1 Is.
Sometimes what one party views as inconsequential, can be highly valuable to the opposing
party. Id
206. Id
207. Id at 124-27.
208. MooRt, supra note 141, at 67, 301. Sometimes the small steps do not work. See
supra notes 202 and 205. Some parties do not want to commit themselves until the very end of
the mediation. See URY, supra note 146, at 128. WThile most conclusions to mediation occur hur-
riedly, it is important for the mediator to slow the process down so that the parties agree to a
proper settlement that is reflective of their agreement. Id at 128-29. The memorialization is im-
portant because implementation of the agreement should be included in any agreement. Id. at
152-53. The mediator must help the parties to foresee potential risks and build in a procedure to
resolve disputes into the settlement agreement. Id. at 153-54. The mediator should help the par-
ties realize their goal is for mutual satisfaction of interests, not victory d at 155-56.
209. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 143, 168, 198-202 and accompanying text discussion on evaluative
mediation. Some critics warn that mediation poses particular dangers to women in divorce rmdia-
tion particularly those involving domestic disputes where there is an imbalance of power. Pene-
lope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power. 40 Btvr. L Rzv.
441, 444-46 (1992); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for ibmen. 100
YALE LI. 1545, 1549-51 (1991).
211. Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective On a Comprehen-
sive Mediation Statute, 13 OHo ST. J. oN Disp. RESOL 885. 889-91 (1998). See Lov .t .
supra note 142, at 7, tbl.l-l.
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B. Appellate Settlement Programs Draw Upon the Success of Trial
Court Mediation
After the successful adoption of mediation and other ADR programs by
many state trial courts, several appellate courts21 2 instituted their own pro-
grams to help with burgeoning dockets. 2 3 All Federal Circuit Courts have es-
tablished some type of settlement program as required under Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 33.214 Similar to trial court mediation, appellate me-
212. Many state appellate courts have instituted settlement programs. Cal. Sup. Ct. R.
19.5; Conn. Prac. Book § 4103; Ga. Ct. App. R. 52; Ind. Ct. App. R. 2; Ky. R. Civ. P.; Md. R.
8-205; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.02; Ohio Ct. App. R. 15; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann. §§
154.001-.073, Wash. Ct. App. R. 5.5. See also, Mediation is Helping Cut Court Costs, DESERT
NEWs, Dec. 11, 1998, at BI2; Hon. Ruth McGregor, Dispute Resolution Comes to Appellate
Court, 33 Az. Arr. 28 (Nov. 1996); Melvin P. Antell, A View From the Bench: The Casp: Settle.
ments at Appellate Level, 182 NJ. LAW. 17 (Jan/Feb. 1997); Lester H. Berkson, Supreme Court
Mandated Mediation - A Giant Step Forvard, 6 NEv. LAW. 22 (Oct. 1998); Ronald T. Y. Moon,
Letter to the Bar from the Chief Justice, 1994 HAW. BJ. 18 (Nov. 1994); Michael J. Wilkins,
Utah's Appellate Mediation Office Opens January 1998: A New Option for Case Resolution at
the Utah Court of Appeals, 10 UTAH BJ. 25 (Dec. 1997).
213. This section will focus on federal circuit court of appeals settlement programs be-
cause the Ninth Circuit Court mediated Proposition 187. Todd S. Purdum, Governor Seeks Com-
promise on Aid to Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1999, at ABS 14. Many propositions
are filed in federal district courts. See Holman, supra note 78, at 1253-59. Thus, more proposi-
tion challenges might find their way into the appellate settlement programs. Some criticize the in-
ternalization of ADR programs based on efficiency rather than improving the process and human-
istic goals advocated by the broader ADR movement. ROGERS & MEWEN, MEDIATION POLICY
OBEcrivE HISTORICALLY 1-19; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement In An Ad-
versary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR, " 19 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev.
1, 13-17 (1991) (explaining different appellate settlement programs).
Federal civil appeals have dramatically increased in the past thirty years. CAROL KRAFKA.
JOE S. CECIL., AND PATRICIA LOMBARD, STALKING THE INCREASE IN "'E RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL
APPEALS 3 (1995). Federal civil appeals have out numbered criminal appeals for many years. Id.
at 1-2. Federal civil appeals numbered fewer than 5,000 in 1958, but by 1993, more than
300,000 appeals were filed. Id. at 3, fig. 1. This increase in federal appeals seems to stem from
an increased desire to challenge district court rulings. Id. Growth in the appellate courts out
paced trial court growth by fifty percent. Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Bringing Judgement to Business
Litigation: Mediation and Settlement in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
531, 533 (1997).
214. Federal Rules Appellate Procedure Rule 33 states:
The court may direct the attorneys-and, when appropriate, the parties-to participate in one
or more conferences to address any matter that may aid in disposing of the proceedings,
including the simplifying the issues and discussing settlement. A conference may be con-
ducted in person or by a telephone and be presided over by a judge or other person desig-
nated by the court for that purpose. Before a settlement conference, the attorneys must
consult with their clients and obtain as much authority as feasible to settle the case. The
court may, as a result of a conference, enter an order controlling the course of the pro-
ceedings or implementing any settlement agreement.
FED. R. App. P. 33.
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diation can be comprised of a variety of programs. - 5 However, the ultimate
goal of all the programs is settlement.2 16 The success of these appellate pro-
grams equals that of the trial court programs.2' 7
These settlement programs offer assistance in settling an appeal at a
point when there was no prior assistance.218 These programs help parties forge
a settlement when settlement might be hardest: after trial where there has
been an adjudicated winner and loser.219 Many attorneys have been hesitant in
the past to propose settlement on appeal because it can be seen as a sign of
weakness.220 These programs can help the parties and attorneys to overcome
hesitancy to settle by exploring creative, non-judicial, or non-legal solutions
to their conflict.?' In addition to settlement, these programs conserve judicial
215. NIraic, supra note 148, at 5-11. The term appellate mediation, as used in this article.
includes all types of settlement processes that use a third party neutral.
216. One critic warns that emphasis on settlement rates can be misleading. Frank E. A.
Sander, The Obsession Wth Settlement Rates, 11 NEGOr. J. 329 (1995). Settlement rates can be
misleading and not accurately reflect the success of a program because settlement rates exclude
certain factors. Id. at 329. For instance, the rate would not include a case where the mediation
did not end in a settlement, but it got the parties talking, which caused an eventual settlement. Ld.
at 329-30. Moreover, the rates do not reflect the difficulty of the cases settled. Id. at 330. A suc-
cessful mediation in a complex litigation case would save the court's time and expense more than
mediated settlement of a small claims dispute. Ld. The numerous federal programs have many
objectives including settlement, conservation of judicial resources, and case management. Nt rc,
supra note 148, at 3-4.
217. See Dick, supra note 153, at 48. There has been a call for a uniform national report-
ing system to accurately record the settlement statistics. Susan A. FitzGibbon. Appellate Settle-
ment Conference Programs: A Case Study, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL 57, 105 (1993); see also Pro-
ceedings of the Fifty-First Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit and Criminal
Procedure, and Rules Governing Section 2255, 134 FR.D. 321. 326 (1990).
218. In the past, parties at the appellate level either did not offer settlement or rejected of-
fers outright. Thomas F Ball III, Appellate Mediation in the Fourth Circuit: An Idea That Works.
9 S.C. LAw. 28 (Dec. 1997); see also Ganzfried, supra note 213 at 533. The litigation and ap-
peals process further reinforces the all-or-nothing decisions without opportunity to solve the un-
derlying problem. David Aemmer, Appellate Mediation in the Tenth Circuit. 26 CoLo. LAw. 25.
26-27 (1997).
219. See Ball, supra note 218, at 30. Parties may be resistant to settlement because the
winner gloats over the win and the loser clings to the right to appeal to save f=c. ld.
220. Nrauc. supra note 148, at 3-4. Attorneys can help ensure the mediation meets the
party's needs and goals by probing the client's goals and options, helping the parties to be open
to alternatives, and reassuring them a solution should encompass both parties' needs. Aemner.
supra note 218, at 26.
221. Nmsuc, supra note 148, at 3-4. The mediator can help the parties identify underlying
concerns, generate settlement options, and expand settlement discussions by identifying and ad-
dressing concerns outside the legal process. l; see also Berkson. supra note 212. at 22.
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resources and offer aid to the parties in managing their case on appeal.2 2
In the appellate programs, case selection and timing of the conferences
can vary. Some of the programs require mandatory participation, while others
pre-screen cases or randomly select participants. 223 The conferences are usu-
ally held before the briefing stage to save the parties the time and expense of
the briefing process if the parties decide to settle their appeal.224 However, a
few programs allow the conference to occur just prior to oral argument.2 25
All federal appellate programs limit participation to civil cases.2 26 Many
programs further limit participation by eliminating appeals that include a pub-
lic agency as a party or a pro se party.2 27 Participation in the settlement con-
ference does not toll briefing deadlines unless the parties request.228 Participa-
tion in the conference is mandatory once ordered to the settlement program.229
The programs are all non-binding in that all parties must acquiesce to the fi-
nal agreement in order for the settlement to be binding.230 Even if the confer-
ence is unsuccessful in settling the appeal, it can narrow the issues and aid
the parties in managing their appeal. 231 The settlement conference can differ
from private mediation in many ways . 2 For instance, in private mediation
the facts are gathered without formality.233 A private mediation is friendly and
quick with a distinct party focus because the mediator personally conducts the
mediation with the parties present. 2-4 On the other hand, appellate mediation
occurs after filing of the suit, conducting discovery, and a trial where the
rules of evidence limit information gathering and disclosure3 5 The appellate
programs may be less party centered because the parties are not required to
attend unless it would be helpful to the mediation.236 The appellate confer-
222. FitzGibbon, supra note 217, at 67-68; see also Judicial Conference, supra note 217,
at 326; Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 532-33; NiEMic, supra note 148, at 4.
223. NIEaic, supra note 148, at 5-7. Once selected for the program, the parties must par-
ticipate. Id. at 9. Some see this as coercion and detracts from the voluntary nature of mediation.
FitzGibbion, supra note 217, at 75.
224. Niamic, supra note 148, at 7; see also Aemrnmer, supra note 218, at 26.
225. NI ,ic, supra note 148, at 7.
226. Id at 5.
227. Id at 5-6.
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id. at 9; see also supra note 205.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Ni mic, supra note 148, at 4.
232. FitzGibbon, supra note 217, at 57.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 58.
236. Fed. App. Rule of Proc. Rule 33. Some see client attendance at mediation as counter-
productive because the needs for legal and procedural explanations are not necessary when medi-
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ences can be held either in person or telephonically. 37 The circuits that are
geographically large rely on telephonic conferences for cost efficiency and to
save time. 38
While appellate programs may not be exactly the same as private media-
tion, it does not necessarily follow that appellate mediation is not a worth-
while, helpful program. Many of the differences between the mediations actu-
ally benefit appellate mediation because by the time the appellate mediation
occurs, the parties are well aware of their respective legal positions. At this
point, the parties only require third party assistance in resolving their dispute
in a unique and creative fashion.2-*
Appellate mediation is similar to private or trial level mediation in a few
ways. While the client must attend private or trial level mediation, the client
may attend an appellate mediation and should attend if it would assist in the
resolution of the conflict.2 41 Like private mediation, the mediation is confiden-
tia. 242 The settlement programs maintain confidentiality by being completely
ation involves attorneys. I& at 91, 93. But cf. John Fl. Martin, Va Circuit Court of Appeals Pre.
Argument Conference Programs, 40 J. Mo. BAR 251, 258 (1984). On the other hand. clients have
much to gain from attending mediation. Judicial Conference, supra note 217. at 364. Because the
mediation deals with the client's needs and concerns it is wise for them to attend. Id Some
mediators wish the clients to attend at least one session. Id at 364-65.
237. NIasuc, supra note 148. at 8. While telephonic conferences are popular, some criti-
cize their effectiveness. FitzGibbion, supra note 217, at 96. One of the benefits to traditional me-
diation is face to face meetings, which telephonic conferences would lack. Id.: Ntutic. supra
note 148, at 8.
238. NiElC, supra note 148, at 8.
239. FitzGibbion, supra note 217, at 63, 98. The parties will be more focused on narrower
issues and the roles of the parties are clearly defined. Id at 98. In fact, the best solutions from
settlement conferences and mediating occur when the parties voluntarily abandon litigation in
favor of an agreement that "does not leave one party scared and the other exalted.- Kaufman.
supra note 150, at 64.
240. NiN.sc, supra note 148, at 4. The conferences can widen settlement discussions by
combining party's non-legal interests. ld.
241. Dick, supra note 153, at 50. Many who argue to exclude the client or party from me-
diation cite many reasons why exclusion is good. Some say that it is too much a burden on the
client to attend every session. Id. While other argue that client presence alters attorrey perform-
ance because the attorney cannot openly discuss settlement options %%hen the client is presenL Id.
For a detailed analysis of the benefits and drawbacks to client presence at a settlement confer-
ence see Leondard L. Riskin, The Represented Client In A Settlement Conference: The Lessons of
G. Heilemann Brewing Co. . Joesph Oat Corp., 69 Asmt U. L Q 1059 (1991).
242. Nanac, supra note 148. at 9. Confidentiality can help the mediator probe underlying
issues and goals of a party in a caucus without the other party knowing. Aemmer, supra note
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independent of the appellate courts. 243 This confidentiality binds all parties, at-
torneys and the mediator3 4 Only the fact that the parties are participating in
the mediation, any result thereof and filings are public record.245 Just as with
court mandated trial level mediation, the parties do not have to pay for the
mediation, other than the costs of the telephone call and any travel expenses
if the mediation takes place in person.2
46
There are many benefits to appellate mediation. These programs allow
the parties to explore settlement at a time when it seems less likely that set-
tlement would occur.2 47 Moreover, because the mediation is confidential, if
one party requests to participate, the other party would be unaware of this,
thus allowing the requesting party to save face.2 48 In addition, the mediator is
able to guide the parties to compromise and educate them about other choices
for resolution other than litigation.2 49 This process might be difficult given
that the trial court declared one party the legal winner of the conflict.250 One
way this problem can be overcome is to encourage free flow of information,
unburdened by the rules of evidence.25' Therefore, more information, which
might be legally irrelevant, but important to the parties, can be disclosed. 252
This increase of information can help the parties come to a mutually benefi-
cial solution. 253 Finally, the conference is party oriented because it focuses on
what is important to them for settlement, rather than focusing on legal
218, at 26. At these caucus, the mediator can probe the party to see if that party can accommo-
date the other party's objectives or interests. AL Some see the confidentiality as the key to media-
tion's success. See Kaufman, supra note 150, at 760. Should the attorney or party breach this
confidentiality, then the court could censure that party or attorney. Id. at 60; see also In Re Lake
Utopia Ltd., 608 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1979).
243. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 79.
244. NIEMic, supra note 148, at 9.
245. Id. at 10.
246. Id. at 11. The court of appeals funds the settlement programs, but the settlement pro-
grams remain independent of the decision making of the appellate courts.
247. See supra notes 218-19. There are many reasons to settle on appeal including keeping
costs low, preserving professional relationship, and maintaining business. Ball, supra note 200, at
30-31. For a complete discussion of the reasons to settle on appeal, see Ball, supra note 218, at
30-31.
248. FitzGibbon, supra note 217, at 78-79; see also notes 239-46.
249. See Dick, supra note 199, at 49. The Ninth Circuit is firmly rooted in taking an inter-
est-based approach to mediation. Id. The Ninth Circuit Settlement Program has settled many
cases whose agreement focuses on the party's interests than on the legal reasons for appeal. Id.;
see also LOVENHEIM, supra note 142, at 35.
250. See supra notes 219-21.
251. LOVENHEIM, supra note 142, at 66.
252. See supra notes 189-91.
253. See supra note 205-08.
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rights.254
The third party facilitators or mediators have many titles and back-
grounds.255 Some of the circuits hire retired judges who are able to draw on
their experience as attorneys and judges to help the parties resolve their con-
flic 25 6 Most circuits offer additional training to the mediators before they can
participate in the conferences.3 For most of the circuits, the mediator uses a
facilitative style, but it is likely that most mediators will conduct some type
of evaluation simply because the conferences are focused on settlement,
which naturally increases the chances the mediator will evaluate in order to
strongly encourage settlement.L2 8
The mediator can serve an important role in addition to that detailed
above. The mediator can be a sounding board for settlement options and party
proposals.25 9 The mediator can try to insure there is fairness in the conference
process. 26° Furthermore, the mediator can propose different solutions if the
parties are at an impasse.2 61 If the conference begins to stagnate, the mediator
can help the parties to move forward and craft an agreement that focuses on
the parties' needs.262
254. NmsNc, supra note 148, at 10.
255. Id. at 10. Most mediators have prior experience as a mediator or experience negotiat-
ing cases. Id.
256. If given a choice, most attorneys would choose a former judge to mediate because of
the experience the former judge could bring to the mediation especially regarding "current think-
ing and workings of [the] ... court." FitzGibbion, supra note 217. at 80. Some of the circuits
such as the First and Fourth use retired state supreme court justices as mediators. Nreuc. supra
note 148, at 10. On the other hand, the Second Circuit's ground breaking CAMP program ex-
pressly prohibits using current judges as mediators because of the negative psychological aspects
on attorneys and parties when a judge is a mediator. Kaufman. supra note 150. at 760. Moreover,
there is concern that if a judge mediates, he may have to recuse himself later I&- If the mediator
is a non-judge, then there is greater willingness for disclosure. Id.
257. NEi~c, supra note 148, at 10.
258. The circuits mainly use facilitation to help the parties find solutions to underlying
problems. Nmi~c, supra note 148. at 8. Many of the circuits recognize that the mediator may
provide the parties with an analysis of the case. Aemner, supra note 218. at 25. However. only
the First and Second Circuits expressly recognize their mediators may be evaluating parties'
cases. Nmitc, supra note 148, at 8.
259. Nmnc, supra note 148, at 8.
260. While a mediator cannot completely eliminate inequities, he can help keep the media-
tion fair. Aemmer, supra note 218, at 26.
261. FitzGibbion, supra note 217, at 64.
262. The mediator can help the parties work through an impasse without forcing the par-
ties to settle or discounting a particular party's proposal. Aemmer. supra note 218. at 26.
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Appellate mediation has been a useful aid in helping to reduce the appel-
late caseload and conserving judicial resources.2 63 Given the continual rise of
appeals, the impact of these programs will be felt for many years to come.
261
C. Mediation of Proposition 187 - Part Typical Appellate Mediation,
Part Groundbreaking Procedure
The mediation of Proposition 187 was a prime example of appellate me-
diation. At the announcement of the mediation, the parties were firmly en-
trenched in their respective comers with little room for compromise.2 65 Gover-
nor Davis requested assistance to resolve the dispute, albeit not quietly to
save face.266 The mediator met in person and over the phone to bring the par-
ties closer together for settlement.267 The mediator triumphed in brokering a
settlement that satisfies all parties to the mediation.268
1. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Settlement Program
In order to understand the mediated result of Proposition 187, it is im-
portant to examine the Ninth Circuit's Settlement Program. The Ninth Circuit
program is similar to other circuit settlement programs. 269 The purpose of the
Settlement Program is to facilitate settlement.27 0 Not every case is eligible for
the program.27' As such, only 40% of eligible cases are mediated.272 The
263. See supra notes 214 and 222.
264. Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 531.
265. Julie Chao, Both Sides Blast Davis Plan For Mediation of Prop. 187, Neither Camp
Sees Room To Compromise on Measure That Limits Benefits To Illegal Immigrants, S.F. ExAM.
Apr. 16, 199, at A2. The Latino and immigrant groups expressed outrage at the Governor's an-
nouncement. Id. Carlos Holguin, one of the plaintiff attorneys, stated that he would not "barter
away" the Proposition's education section. Harriet Chiang, Davis' Prop. 187 Bid Called Unusual,
Experts say Mediation Won't End Controversy, S.F. CHRON. Apr. 17, 1999, at A13.
266. Ed Mendel, Davis Takes Middle Road on Prop. 187 Suit, He Urges Mediation on Im-
migrant Issue, Both Sides Angered, S.D. UNIoN-TRm. Apr. 16, 1999, at Al.
267. Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Talks Offered Davis Few Choices Mediation: Even If
He Had Won, Years of Appeals Would Have Ensued, L.A. TiMES, July 30, 1999, at A3.
268. Dave Lesher & Henry Weinstein, Prop. 187 Backers Accuse Davis of Ignoring Voters
Court: They Vow to Mount New Legal Challenge to Accord That Kills the Anti-Illegal Immigrant
Measure, L.A. TimEs, July 30, 1999, at Al.
269. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 12-16.
270. Id. at 72. The Ninth Circuit Settlement Program was established in 1984 and is gov-
erned by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 33 and local rules. Ninth Cir. R. 3-4, 15-2,
33-1; see also CHRISTOPHER A. GOELZ & MEREDITH J. WATTS. CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE FED-
ERAL NINTH CIRCUIT CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE 5:4 (1995).
271. See GOELZ, supra note 270, at In 5:7-:8.
272. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 72.
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Ninth Circuit is large and thus most mediations are conducted
telephonically.273
The Settlement Program office selects participants based on many factors
as gleaned from the Docketing Statement forwarded to the office from the
Ninth Circuit clerk's office.27' The settlement office reviews the Docketing
Statement and decides which cases would be more appropriate for mediation
based on the parties' interests, whether the case would benefit from media-
tion, and the likelihood of settlement. -75 Only 5% of cases are mediated from
party request 276
The Ninth Circuit Settlement Program conducts two kinds of confer-
ences. 277 The first is an assessment conference where the mediator meets
briefly with the parties to determine if their case would be eligible for the
Settlement Program because the information contained in the Docketing State-
ment was insufficient. 27 This conference is usually very short -3 The second
conference is the settlement conference or mediationm The settlement con-
ference is structured to meet the needs of the parties and their circum-
stances.281 The settlement conference usually lasts four to eight hours with
one or more follow-up conferences.?2
A representative from each side must attend the conference once selected
for participation in mediation. 20 If one or both sides do not attend, they can
be sanctioned. 224 While the parties do not have to attend, the attorneys must
273. Id Up to 75% of the cases are mediated via the telephone. 14: Gori.z supra note
270, at 5:90.
274. 1,& at 73; see also Goaz, supra note 270, at 1 5:8. :25, :66. Parties must serve the
Docketing Statement on all parties. Got.z, supra note 270, at 5:31. The statement is not bind-
ing on the appeal; however, failure to file one is grounds for dismissal of the appeal. Id. at
5:26; Ninth Cir. Rule 3-4(a). The statement gives the mediator an overview of the case. GoL.z.
supra note 270, at 5:44. The statement should not exceed 250 words. 1I
275. NiMIac, supra note 148, at 73; GoELz. supra note 270. at 7 5:67. While the mediators
are able to select any case they typically select cases which would benefit from participation with
a focus on settlement. GoaLz, supra note 270, at 5:67.
276. NIesic, supra note 148. at 74.
277. I. at 75-76.
278. 1,L at 75.
279. I. at 77.
280. id at 76.
281. 1I
282. Id at 77.
283. I
284. 1i at 79. The court can impose disciplinary or monetary sanctions. Goaz. supra note
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consult with the parties before the conference.285 The parties may attend if it
would be beneficial or the parties or mediator request party attendance. 28 6
The settlement conference is confidential to help the parties freely dis-
cuss their case. The mediator encourages open and frank discussions. 287 The
conference is confidential and the parties may not disclose the substance of
the conference to the public or the judge.288 To insure confidentiality, the set-
tlement office is separate from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and main-
tains separate files. 289
If the settlement conference is unsuccessful, the mediator and the parties
can make some case management decisions. The parties can limit the issues,
briefing, and define the record on appeal.290 If the conference is successful,
the mediator will help the parties to draft an agreement and request a dismis-
sal from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.29'
The Ninth Circuit mediators who are randomly assigned to mediate cases
are experienced attorneys with training and experience in mediation and set-
tlement.292 There are five mediators in San Francisco and one in Seattle.293
The mediators conduct the conferences in a facilitative style.294 The mediators
do not arm-twist the parties into settlement.2 95 They help the parties conduct
their own risk-benefit analysis of their case. 2
96
270, at 5:36; Ninth Cir. Rule 42-1.
285. Id. at 76; see also Fed. R. App. Proc. Rule 33; GoELz, supra note 270, at 5:132.
Before the start of the conference, the attorney should consult with the client and create a settle-
ment plan. The attorney and client should discuss client's interest on appeal and what the client
hopes to achieve on appeal. GOELZ, supra note 270, at 5:112. It is advisable to be creative and
foresighted by anticipating what opposing party would hope to gain on appeal and then decide
how the client could meet opposing party's needs. Id. at U :5112-14.
286. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 76; GOELZ, supra note 270, at 5:132.
287. NiEmixc, supra note 148, at 76. The parties should be prepared to discuss the merits of
the appeal including facts, law, and issues on appeal. GOELZ, supra note 270, at 1 5:108. How-
ever, the attorneys should not dwell on the merits, but should focus on what is necessary to settle
by keeping an open mind and being flexible. Id. at :109.
288. NIEMIc, supra note 148, at 78. Statements and any comments are confidential and are
not to be disclosed. GoELz, supra note 270, at 5:135.
289. NtEmic, supra note 148, at 78. The mediator can play no role in the resolution of the
case on its merits. GOELZ, supra note 270, at 5:10.
290. NiEMic, supra note 148, at 77; GoELz, supra note 270, at 5:69, 5:71.
291. NiEmic, supra note 148, at 77.
292. Id. at 79; GOELZ, supra note 270, at 5:5, 5:9.
293. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 79; GOEL, supra note 270, at 5:11.5
294. NIEMIC, supra note 148, at 72, 14.
295. See Dick, supra note 153, at 48.
296. Id. There are many reasons for parties to settle on appeal. For instance, the parties
may wish to avoid risk of defeat, delay, and avoid establishing precedent. Goat.z, supra note
270, at 5:153-168. In addition, the parties may wish to reduce costs, facilitate closure, and
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2. Mediation of Proposition 187
Governor Gray Davis announced on April 15, 1999, that he was going to
request the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Settlement Program to mediate
the dispute over Proposition 187.297 The announcement was a shock to all
parties and the Settlement Office.-9 After the initial shock wore off, the par-
ties began expressing their disbelief that mediation would alter their positions
and thought settlement was impossible.-4 The announcement placed Governor
Davis in a tight political comer because supporters of Proposition 187 wanted
an appellate decision, whereas opponents wanted the appeal dropped3- 0 The
Governor's announcement put him at odds with Lieutenant Governor Cruz-
Bustamante, who foresaw only one resolution to the mediation: end the ap-
peal and keep the criminal provisions."'
Before the mediation began, the Governor made an effort to include the
views and opinions of those groups who supported Proposition 187 by calling
for a meeting with group representatives - However, after the short meeting,
the groups expressed disappointment with the Governor's mediation position
and implied that Proposition 187 was going to be undefended during the me-
diation.303 The groups made an interesting point because the Governor seemed
to be as opposed to Proposition 187 at that moment as he was in 1994. For
example, during Mexican President Zedillo's visit to California in May 1999,
preserve an ongoing relationship. Id.
297. Ed Mendel, Davis Takes Middle Road on Prop. 187 Suit, He Urges Mediation on Im-
migrant Issues; Both Sides Angered, SAN Dmwco UNIoN-TRm.. Apr. 16, 1999. at Al. Davis argued
that he could settle the appeal while remaining faithful to the electorate without enduring a five-
year appeal- lI
298. Id.
299. Fitzgibbon supra note 217, at 49, and accompanying texl.
300. Davis Won't Stick to Prop. 187 Clause, 7he Governor Opposes Denying Illegal Immi-
grants Public School Access, PREs-ENT. RtvERsmF. May 22, 1999, at Al.
301. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3. Governor Davis also put himself at odds with
other California Democrats. Todd S. Purdum, Fight on Immigrant Measure Splits California
Democrats, N.Y. Tisms. Apr. 25, 1999, at ABS 18.
302. See Chao, supra note 265, at AZ
303. Dave Lesher, Prop. 187 Backers Call Davis Inclusion Pledge Insincere Court: After
Meeting With State Official, Lmawyers for Measure's Sponsors Say the Governor Iias Engaging in
Political Theater When He Referred Matter to Mediation, LA. TmES. May 11, 1999, at Aig.
The meeting lasted 50 minutes. Id The supporters of Proposition 187 said that they lost hope
when the Governor sent a single deputy attorney general who gave the supporters the impression
that their views would not be fully represented. Id
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the Governor declared that the negative effects of Proposition 187 would
never be felt and that he would not be party "to kick[ing] children out of
school. ' '304 Those two statements, combined with the Governor's pre-election
stance on Proposition 187, gave strong support to the notion that the Gover-
nor used the mediation to save his political skin.305 Concerned that Proposi-
tion 187 would be undefended, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court to prohibit mediation of initiatives. 306
The Supreme Court summarily denied the request.
307
Regardless of the political machinations, the Ninth Circuit mediator per-
formed beautifully. The Chief Circuit Mediator, David E. Lombardi, moved
the talks forward when there was an impasse.0 8 He told the press that the
mediation was active with many different parties and respective positions.309
Over three months, the mediator navigated the parties from being diabolically
opposed to mutual agreement by making non-negotiable issues more negotia-
ble.310 The parties believed that they were not getting special treatment be-
cause of who they were and the topic of their dispute. 3" The mediation was
conducted once in person. Thereafter, several meetings were held via tele-
phone with numerous facsimile communications. 3 2 In the end, each party
claimed that the mediation was fruitful and that the mediator had instilled an
atmosphere where parties compromised a little on both sides to come to an
agreement." 3
304. Dave Lesher, Davis Won't Follow Prop. 187 on Schools Politics: Governor Vows Not
To Implement Provision That Would Deny Illegal Immigrant Children Access to Public Educa-
tion. Critics Say He's Betraying His Oath, LA. TIMEs, May 21, 1999, at Al. Opponents of Pro-
position 187 were pleased that the Governor advocated dropping the education section because it
was the most important section at issue on appeal. Id.
305. Terri Hardy, Davis Seeks Mediation on Prop. 187, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 16, 1999,
at N1.
306. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association filed suit on June 1, 1999, to prevent the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals from mediating Proposition 187. High Court Refuses to Block Prop.
187 Mediation Effort, LA. Tims, July 2, 1999, at A26. The Association claimed it was neutral
on Proposition 187, but objected to the "secret mediation of the legality of ballot measures." Id.
307. Id. The California Supreme Court unanimously denied the Association's request for a
hearing. Id.
308. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3. Lombardi has worked with the Ninth Circuit
Settlement Program since 1992. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.; see also supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
311. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3. Chief Mediator Lombardi set a July 30 dead-
line for the mediation. Id. The impression was that he would not extend talks based on the con-
troversial topic. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. Responding to criticism that the mediation was nothing more than a backroom
deal, Shirley Hufstedler, the Governor's personal attorney, stated that it was "better to settle than
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D. Future of Appellate Mediation and Initiatives
The mediation of Proposition 187 was successful only in the limited
sense that it resolved the dispute between the Governor of California and the
eight plaintiffs.314 No legal precedent was established.315 Hence, the problem
with mediation, especially appellate mediation, is that confidentiality prevents
public access and public resolution of disputes.3 16 Confidentiality in the appel-
late mediation programs is particularly worrisome because it is the responsi-
bility of the appellate courts to establish and interpret the law.3t7 Moreover,
the mediation of Proposition 187 will never truly be a success because medi-
ated settlements need party participation for effective resolution of conflict,
but the parties for initiatives are the citizen voters of a state.3 , Mediation of
initiatives can never educate and meet the individual needs of so many peo-
ple.319 Furthermore, mediation of Proposition 187 did not, and could not, ad-
dress the underlying reasons why Proposition 187 was so popular"
Mediation may be an effective, useful tool to resolve many types of
cases, but it can never establish rules of law or precedent.3-' The drafters of
Proposition 187 wanted to challenge the United States Supreme Court ruling
to take risks" and that all the parties had to come to that conclusion before an agreement could
be reached. Id Thomas A. Saenz, attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, stated that the mediation involved much give and take and that both sides gave up
something in the end. Id.
314. Id
315. Because the Proposition 187 opinion is a district court opinion, it is not binding on
other courts under the doctrine of stare decisis. 20 A.%t JuR. 2 Courts § 165 (1995).
316. See generally STuART S. NAGEL & NUMi K. MILLS. EDS.. SySTmATIC ANALYSIs IN
DispuT. RESOLUTION 245 (1991).
317. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also 20 A.L Jun. 2D Courts § 165
(1995); see also U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
318. See supra notes 236 and 241.
319. One of the purposes of the court system is to explain, guide, and educate the public
about the law. See Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 532.
320. Proposition 187's popularity is the beguiling reflection of social and economic state in
1994 California. See supra notes 114-21. Additionally, there ar many reports and polls to indi-
cate that Proposition 187 would pass today.
321. Norman Brand, The Misuse of Mediation Prop. 187. Leave the Issue to the Courts:
Using This Avenue Puts it and Constitution at Risk, L.A. Tis, May 6. 1999, at B9. Mediation
is effective particularly in resolving disputes over money, property, or contracts. Id. ADR offers a
new tool to resolve disputes which individuals might be more comfortable with because it is in-
formal, secret and without sanction of law. NAGEL, supra note 316. at 245.
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in Plyler v. Doe.322 They will never get that opportunity.32 The Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Association tried to challenge the validity of mediating initiatives,
especially Proposition 187, but the Supreme Court of California rebuffed their
request.3 24
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Settlement Program did not exceed
its power or act in an unprofessional manner.325 From all indications, the Set-
tlement Program performed admirably.326 The underlying problem concerns
court sponsored private resolution of a public law issue.3 27 The mediator does
not act as a judge whose opinion explains, guides, and educates the public
about the law.32s Only written judicial opinions guide the public and engage
in an analysis of the law. 329 The opinions are the glue that holds our legal
system together.330
Our system of justice needs judicial opinions to establish the precedent
necessary for stare decisis. 33' 'Without judicial opinions, the legal system will
322. Sandy Harrison, Lawyers Ready For Fight Over Prop. 187 If Initiative Passes, Back-
ers Plan to Argue For Overturning Supreme Court Ruling, L.A. DAILY NEWS. Oct. 31, 1994, at
N4; see also Dave Lesher, Davis Faces Deep Dilemma Over Appeal of Prop. 187 Courts: Gover-
nor Must Decide Whether To Keep Defending Anti-immigrant Measure That He Opposes, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al. Constitutional decisions can be overturned against conventional
stare decisis doctrine if the interpretation has produced harm. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review §
559 (1995).
323. There had been some discussion about challenging the authority of the courts to me-
diate a constitutional issue, but as of the date of this Article, no lawsuit had been filed. See Mc-
Donnell, supra note 267, at A3.
324. See supra notes 306-07.
325. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3. The Settlement Program agreed to mediate
the Proposition 187 lawsuits when Governor Davis requested assistance. See supra note 297; see
also FED. IR App. P. 33 (enumerating powers of Appeals Court program).
326. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3; see also supra notes 308-13.
327. Joel Fox, Commentary, Who Represents Voters At the Mediation Table? 187: Unless
Gov. Davis' Plan Is Challenged, A Precedent Could Be Set That Puts The Initiative Process At
Risk, L.A. TiMEs, June 1, 1999, at B5. Another issue is the secrecy of the process makes it diffi-
cult to gather data to evaluate the success of the program beyond settlement. NAGEL & MILLs,
supra note 316, at 245. Moreover, the focus of ADR programs is not to assign responsibility;
rather, the focus is satisfaction and settlement. Id.
328. See Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 532; NAGEL & MILLS, supra note 316, at 248.
Courts play a key role in complex policy debates. David M. Trubek, The Construction and
Deconstruction of a Disputes-Focused Approach: An Afterward, 15 LAW & Soc'y. REv. 726, 741
(1980).
329. See Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 532. The court system's purpose is to interpret the
law, rights, principles, and rules that protect individuals and groups. See generally Craig A.
McEwen, Differing Visions of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Formal Law, 12 JUsT. SYs. J.
247 (1987)(discussing the differences in cultural effect between litigation and ADR).
330. See Ganzfried, supra note 218, at 532.
331. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 147 (1995).
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begin to degrade.33 2 Stare decisis is particularly important in cases presenting
constitutional law issues.3 33 The confidentiality of mediation begins to break
stare decisis down because the lack of written, public opinion.33' Confidential-
ity does not create a public record for future guidance.3-5
Moreover, only the courts should serve as final arbiters of conflicts over
rights. In addition, courts alone can make or interpret the law3-6 by reinforc-
ing social values and goals.3 37 Consequently, only the courts can protect mi-
nority groups.33 Since mediation fails to state or interpret the law, mediation
does not guide behavior or define what is legally right or wrong. Critics ar-
gue mediation cannot substitute for a court resolution of public issues.33 9
In a larger sense, private resolution of public conflict will most likely
undermine the public's trust in government and the judicial system.- 1 The
Government will appear as if shirking its duty to protect individual rights.-",
The lack of a public record, resulting from the confidentiality of mediation
and other ADR processes, can decrease the court's role in our society and the
accountability of government to the people.1 -2 This decrease in trust in the
332. See NAcEL & MiLLs, supra note 316. at 245. By using ADR processes, the courts
miss the opportunity to shape conduct of citizens, offer opportunities for remedy, and act as pub-
lic resource for defining rules and rights. See McEwen, supra note 329, at 252.
333. 20 AM. JuP. 2D Courts § 161 (1995).
334. See NAGEL & Mnis, supra note 316. at 244, 248.
335. Id. at 259. As a result of confidentiality and lack of judicial opinions. private groups
may make public policy decisions. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dis.
pute Resolution, 62 TuL L REv. 1, 32 (1987).
336. U.S. CosT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also NAGEL & MLLS, supra note 316. at 259.
337. See Chao, supra note 265.
338. See NAGEL & MaiLs, supra note 316. at 248.
339. Id. at 249. The judicial system becomes focused on settlement rather than a public re-
sources for defining rules and rights. McEwen, supra note 329, at 252. The courts then are re-
solvers of private disputes rather than discussion makers who enumerate socially sanctioned val-
ues. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE Li. 1073, 1085 (1984): see also
SusAN Snsy & AusT SARAT. DIsPUTE PRoCEssIG IN LAW AND LEGAL ScitoLAqsittv FRtO% L'N.
srrTnTONAL CRrnQUE TO RECOsrrtrio,4 OF THE JUDICIAL SUmECT 85 (1988)
340. Id. at 259. Just as important, over-clogged courts are unable to resolve disputes in a
timely fashion, creating public dissatisfaction and disillusionment with government. NAGEL &
MiLis, supra note 316, at 246. The court system is thus caught in a catch 22--dissatisfaction
with the judicial system with ADR and dissatisfaction with the judicial system without ADR.
341. Id. The ADR processes can weaken the cultural importance of the courts because it
denies citizens their right to tell their story to the public. Judith Resnick, Due Process: A Public
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L REv. 405, 413 (1987).
342. NAGEL & MILLs, supra note 316, at 259.
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government can be seen in the reactions to the mediation of Proposition
.187. 34 3 Many critics believed the Governor violated his constitutional duty by
failing to appeal Proposition 187 because the Governor decided to mediate
the dispute, leaving it essentially undefended because he was against it in
1994 believing many portions were unconstitutional.3" The public may never
'know of the Governor's true intent because the mediation was subject to con-
fidentiality and not open to the public.345
The private nature of mediation is an important issue that must be re-
solved for effective resolution of public conflicts 4 6 Either the courts must
alone resolve public conflicts involving constitutional rights, or mediation and
the other ADR processes must become public 47 Some appellate programs
have solved this problem by expressly excluding constitutional issues from
participation in the appellate settlement programs. 48 Moreover, expert
mediators argue whether conflicts over individual rights, crimes, and personal
liberty should be mediated.349 Perhaps the appellate mediation of Proposition
187 was a fluke.350 After all, how often will the Government, charged with
defending the will of the People, change mid-suit?35' Clearly, with the ever-
increasing popularity of mediation, future initiatives will be mediated. The ap-
pellate court programs must be ready to meet the challenges while still main-
taining an important role in dispute resolution. 352 Mediation is a popular and
343. Id.
344. See supra notes 299-303.
345. Ed Mendel, Bustamante Widens Split With Davis On 187, Attorney General To File
Brief On Initiative, SAN DIEGO U-TiuB. Apr. 21, 1999, at A3; see also Olivo, supra note 152, at
Al.
346. See McDonnell, supra note 267, at A3
347. See NAGEL & Miu.s, supra note 316, at 259, 262-63.
348. Melvin P. Antell, The CASP: Settlements At The Appellate Level, 182 NJ. LAW. 17
(Jan.-Feb. 1997).
349. See LOVENHEIM, supra note 142, at 15; Hon. Ruth McGregor, Dispute Resolution
Comes To Appellate Court, 33 ARtz Arr'v 28 (Nov. 1996).
350. See Dave Lesher & Dan Morain, Davis Asks Court to Mediate On Prop. 187: Gover-
nor Takes Unusual Step To Try To Resolve Constitutionality of Controversial Immigration Mea-
sure, Those On Both Sides of The Issue Criticize The Move, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1999, at Al;
see also Richard Estrada, Commentary, Storm Over Prop. 187 Misses the Nuance Politics: U.S.
Neglect of Immigration Policy Led to Approval of the Measure, Which Focuses On Immigrant
Policy, L.A. TIMEs. Apr. 27, 1999, at B7; Dan Morain, Debate Rises on Mediation of Proposition
187, L.A. TwiEs, Apr. 20, 1999, at Al.
351. Since the lawsuits over Proposition 187 were filed, no other initiative, to the date of
this paper, has been mediated. Moreover, since Proposition 187's appeal, many controversial pro-
positions have been challenged on appeal including English only (Proposition 229) and Indian
Gaming (Proposition 5) and none of these challenges has ended in mediation.
352. See supra notes 333-35 (discussing weaknesses in current ADR programs).
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effective tool to resolve conflict. 353 However, mediation of public issues will
never truly satisfy society's need for stability and awareness of the law,
which courts provide.35 Appellate mediation must rise to these challenges if
it is to remain an effective device for resolving disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Initiatives have made an indelible impression on the political and gov-
ernmental landscape in the twentieth century. However, certain recent initia-
tives have been the result of anti-minority sentiment. Such was the case with
Proposition 187. Drafters of Proposition 187 blamed the economic crisis of
the early 1990's on illegal immigrants. Moreover, the drafters wanted to chal-
lenge the United States Supreme Court precedent, though they will never
have that opportunity. Proposition 187 became the first initiative to be re-
solved by mediation. Today many courts use mediation to decrease their
caseloads. While a more recent addition to the ADR landscape, appellate me-
diation has nevertheless been successful in resolving disputes at a point when
settlement had proved difficult.
For all its beneficial attributes, mediation's confidentiality creates a diffi-
cult problem when constitutional issues are to be resolved. The cornerstone to
stare decisis is precedent. Should more initiatives involving constitutional is-
sues be mediated, stare decisis will slowly erode. The impact of mediated res-
olutions of constitutional appeals will not be readily apparent for many years
due to the slow appeals process and relatively low number of initiative ap-
peals. In order to decrease the impact on stare decisis, appellate mediation
programs should specifically disallow constitutional issues from participation
in such programs.
353. See supra note 319.
354. See NAGEL & IMLLs, supra note 316. at 259. Moreover, impacts may not be immedi-
ately observable or known. Id. at 245.
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